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ABSTRACT
Recent corporate scandals demonstrate that rank-and-file employees often remain
silent in the face of significant fraud. This silence is unfortunate because
corporate employees have inside knowledge of misconduct that gives them an
information advantage over more traditional corporate monitors, such as
independent directors and government regulators. To address this problem, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act utilized a new approach that encourages employee
whistleblowers to disclose information about corporate wrongdoing. This
approach, which Professor Moberly labels the “Structural Model,” requires that
corporations provide a standardized channel for employees to report
organizational misconduct to official monitors within the corporation. This
Article offers an original framework for analyzing the effectiveness of SarbanesOxley’s Structural Model. Utilizing behavioral science research that analyzes
whistleblower motivations, Professor Moberly finds that the Structural Model
reduces difficulties corporate employees experience in disclosing misconduct, and
thereby provides an improved mechanism to encourage employees to become
more active and effective corporate monitors. However, the Structural Model has
significant flaws, which Professor Moberly addresses by offering several
suggestions for improving the model’s usefulness as a tool against corporate
crime.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent corporate scandals reveal opposing perspectives on
the ability of rank-and-file employees to be corporate monitors.
From one perspective, the scandals demonstrate employees’
efficacy as monitors with accurate insider knowledge about the
inner workings of their corporation. At great risk to their careers,
a few employee whistleblowers bravely attempted to expose
wrongdoing at many corporations involved in recent scandals,
such as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and several mutual
funds companies.1

1

See discussion infra Part II.B.
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Viewed differently, however, the scandals also illustrate the
difficulty of relying upon employees to function as effective
corporate monitors. The financial misconduct at Enron and other
companies lasted for years before being revealed publicly.2
Countless lower-level employees necessarily knew about, were
exposed to, or were involved superficially in the wrongdoing and
its concealment – but few disclosed it, either to company officials
or to the public.3 Thus, while the corporate scandals demonstrate
employees’ potential to monitor corporations, they also confirm
that this potential often is not fully realized.
In this Article, I evaluate the most recent attempt to encourage
employees to become more effective corporate monitors, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed by Congress in response to the
corporate scandals.4
The Act utilizes two approaches to
encourage corporate whistleblowers.5 The first is best described
as a version of the well-known Anti-retaliation Model, which
involves protecting whistleblowers from employer retaliation

2 For example, immediately prior to declaring bankruptcy in December 2001,
Enron restated its earnings for each year between 1997 through 2001 because of the
accounting problems that occurred during that time. See William C. Powers, Jr., et al.,
Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron
Corp., at 2, 32, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/
sicreport020102.pdf (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Powers Report].
3 See discussion, infra Part II.B. Cf. Rebecca Goodell, A Presentation of Empirical
Research on Compliance Practices: What Companies Say They are Doing – What Employees
Hear, in CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE “GOOD CITIZEN”
CORPORATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SYMPOSIUM ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 136, 137 (1995) [hereinafter GOOD CITIZEN] (presenting survey result that
one in three employees witnessed significant corporate misconduct). Of course, many
employees worked at corporations engaging in illegal conduct without any reason to
suspect wrongdoing. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 239 (2004). Rather than focus
on these employees, this Article is concerned with employees who have reason to
suspect misrepresentations or fraud, but do nothing about it.
4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of the United States Code).
5 A third model, the Bounty Model, has proven to be a particularly effective
means of encouraging whistleblowing by giving financial incentives to whistleblowers.
See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial
Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 278-82 (1992)
(listing examples of various rewards to whistleblowers provided by federal and state
statutes). The Bounty Model, however, is not extensively applied to encourage the
reporting of fraud against corporations themselves (as opposed to fraud against the
government) and, unlike the two models discussed in this Article, was not implemented
in response to the corporate scandals. Accordingly, although it is an intriguing idea that
deserves further study, applying the Bounty Model to prevent fraud against
corporations is beyond the scope of this Article.
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after the employee discloses wrongdoing.6 The second approach,
which I label the Structural Model, requires that corporations
provide employees with a standardized channel to report
organizational misconduct internally within the corporation.7
While academic and public attention has focused almost
exclusively on Sarbanes-Oxley’s version of the Anti-retaliation
Model,8 this Article is the first comprehensive academic work to
analyze the ability of Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to
engage corporate employees in the battle to reduce corporate
fraud. Utilizing social science research analyzing whistleblower
motivations, I conclude that the Structural Model may produce
more effective disclosures from whistleblowing employees than
prior attempts to encourage whistleblowing, because the model
addresses two significant problems that previously kept
employees from consistently functioning as successful corporate
monitors.
In Part II of the Article, I use specific examples from the recent
corporate scandals to illustrate these problems, both of which
relate to the flow of employees’ inside knowledge of wrongdoing
within a corporation. First, during the scandals, employee
information about wrongdoing did not flow readily. Despite
having inside knowledge about corporate misconduct, employees
rarely spoke out about wrongdoing because of a compelling norm

6 See MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 232 (1992);
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 5, at 273-78; Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry
Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100
(2000).
7 The structure of the channel can be fairly simple, such as designating an internal
officer to receive such reports or setting up a “hotline” for employees to call.
Organizations also might install more complex reporting systems, complete with
ombudsmen who handle employee reports, ensure anonymity for the employees,
investigate their concerns, and provide employees feedback on the outcome of the
investigations. See, e.g., Marlene Winfield, Whistleblowers as Corporate Safety Net, in
WHISTLEBLOWING – SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 24 (1994) (describing
ombudsmen system implemented by Otis Elevator Company); Alan R. Yuspeh, Sharing
“Best Practices” Information, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 64.
8 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. KOHN, ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW (2004); Leonard M.
Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the
Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 875 (2002); Miriam A.
Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2004); Robert G. Vaughn,
America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1 (2005); Ashlea Ebeling, Blowing the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistle, FORBES.COM (June 18,
2003), available at http://www.forbes.com/2003/06/18/cx_ae_0618beltway_print.html.
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of silence among employees.9 Second, on the rare occasion when
employees spoke out, corporate executives typically blocked or
filtered the information provided by employees before it reached
traditional corporate monitors, such as the board of directors or
the government. The few “successful” whistleblowers overcame
these two problems; thousands of other rank-and-file employees
did not.
In Part III of the Article, I describe the two approaches utilized
by Sarbanes-Oxley to address these problems – the Antiretaliation Model and the Structural Model. Here I conclude that
the Anti-retaliation Model implemented by Sarbanes-Oxley is not
sufficient to address these flow-of-information difficulties. By
contrast, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model offers significant
improvements over versions of the Structural Model utilized prior
to the corporate scandals. First, the Act requires that corporate
boards of public companies establish avenues (i.e., structures) for
employees to report wrongdoing directly to the independent
directors on the board’s audit committee – not to corporate
executives.10 Second, Sarbanes-Oxley made the implementation
of this disclosure channel mandatory.11
In Part IV, I evaluate these improvements and suggest that
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model is more likely than the Antiretaliation Model to reduce the flow-of-information problems that
contributed to the corporate scandals, because the model provides
a direct and legitimate disclosure channel from employees to the
board of directors. This requirement should encourage more
whistleblowing because it provides incentives to increase
employee participation as corporate monitors and reduces various
disincentives to employee whistleblowing.12 Equally important,
this direct channel to the board should encourage effective
whistleblowing by circumventing information blocking and
filtering from corporate executives.13 In this way, SarbanesOxley’s Structural Model minimizes the principal-agent problem
that arises when employees provide information about
misconduct to mid-level managers and corporate executives who
cover-up or ignore the fraud. Furthermore, the model should

9 See, e.g., Terance D. Miethe & Joyce Rothschild, Whistleblowing and the Control of
Organization Misconduct, 64 SOC. INQUIRY 322, 332-37 (1994) (finding low levels of
whistleblowing after discovery of misconduct); Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due
Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 119-23 (1995).
10 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A) (Supp. 2002).
11 See id.
12 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
13 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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provide several secondary benefits to corporations and their
employees, such as improving corporate decision-making,
reducing monitoring costs, and increasing employee voice within
the corporation. Such benefits may lead to greater acceptance and
implementation than pre-scandal attempts to encourage
whistleblowers.14
Although it is an improvement over prior approaches,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model still suffers from significant
flaws. In Part V, I explain the inadequacies of Sarbanes-Oxley’s
Structural Model and offer several suggestions for improvement.
One problem is that the model may not work well enough:
corporations may implement disclosure channels that appear
sound on paper, but do not work in reality.15 This “cheating”
problem can be addressed in several ways. First, corporations
could disclose information regarding their whistleblower system.
For example, corporations could publicize the structure of their
whistleblower disclosure model publicly in order to advise
shareholders and employees of the extent of their system.
Similarly, corporations could be required to disclose various
metrics regarding the effectiveness of their disclosure channel,
such as the number and type of complaints and the resolution of
those complaints.
Through these disclosures, shareholders,
employees, and government regulators could evaluate the
effectiveness of a whistleblower disclosure system. A second way
to address the cheating problem is to provide corporations a true
incentive to create effective whistleblower systems by permitting
a limited safe harbor for corporations that implement verifiably
effective whistleblower channels prior to any wrongdoing.
The converse of the “cheating” problem presents another
potential difficulty: the model may work too well. Complaints
from employees may overwhelm directors and prevent them from
efficiently and sufficiently addressing the complaints, much less
attend to their obligation to oversee the business of the
company.16 Addressing this “noise” problem may require the
SEC to promulgate regulations that reduce the burden on
directors, while still requiring director oversight of the
information obtained through a whistleblower disclosure channel.
For example, the SEC may explicitly permit directors to outsource
initial review of such disclosures to ethics officers or third-parties
that report directly to the board rather than to corporate

See discussion infra Part IV.C.
See discussion infra Part V.B.
16 See discussion infra Part V.C.
14
15
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executives. Approving sufficient, but limited, whistleblower
structures through regulation may prevent corporations from
implementing inefficient and cumbersome systems in order to
satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley’s vague mandate.
Ultimately, the goal of the Structural Model should be to
balance the need for employees to disclose important inside
knowledge to independent directors with the need for directors to
efficiently and effectively monitor all aspects of a corporation’s
business. Sarbanes-Oxley’s approach is a good start, but in its
current form, it fails to provide frameworks that fully utilize
employees’ ability to monitor corporations effectively.
II. THE NEED TO ENCOURAGE MORE EFFECTIVE
WHISTLEBLOWING
A. Information Problems and the Traditional Corporate Monitors
Effective
corporate
monitoring
benefits
corporate
shareholders and employees, as well as the general public.17
Traditional monitoring occurs through a variety of overlapping
means. A board of directors monitors a corporation’s professional
management on behalf of the shareholders, who are too dispersed
and diverse to monitor management themselves.18 Professional
corporate “gatekeepers,” such as auditors and attorneys, provide
outside monitoring of corporations that protects shareholders as
well as the investing public.19 Further, the government monitors
companies through government inspectors and by requiring
various corporate reports to be filed.20

17 See Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christine J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics,
and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 316 (2004); Reinier H.
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857,
863 (1984); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 28085 (2004).
18 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Enron’s Tangled Web: Complex Relationships;
Unanswered Questions, 71 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 1167, 1170-74 (2002-03); Troy A. Paredes,
Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495, 498 & n.14 (Nancy B. Rapoport
& Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) [hereinafter FIASCOS]; Ribstein, supra note 17, at 285.
19 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308-10 (2004); Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54
(1986).
20 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (requiring public companies to make periodic filings
with the Securities and Exchange Commission). Government-like entities, such as
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A primary advantage of each of these traditional corporate
monitors is that they are external to the company. Directors who
are independent purportedly provide dispassionate oversight of
management.21 Gatekeepers have reputational concerns outside
of their contractual relationship with corporations to inspire them
to provide effective monitoring.22 When the government enforces
laws and regulations, accountability to the public at large keeps
regulators from being influenced by the corporation’s own goals.
Despite the advantage of external monitors, however, such
distance presents a significant challenge: monitoring the inner
workings of a company from the outside.23 External monitors
must rely upon information they receive from corporate
executives in order to fulfill their monitoring function.24 Even
under the best circumstances, this information is certain to be
incomplete and self-serving due to information blocking and
filtering by executives and subordinate managers.25 Under the

various securities listing agencies like the New York Stock Exchange, also monitor
corporations.
21 Independent directors are a principal means by which to monitor corporate
managers. Their independence can enhance the objectivity of the board because
independent directors are not as dependent on short-term corporate results to maintain
their position with the corporation. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and
Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 244-50 (1997); Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better
Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213,
1237 n.100 (2000). Moreover, they may be more willing to disclose wrongdoing
publicly, because they can do so without losing their employment. See Eisenberg, supra,
at 244-48; Kostant, supra at 1237 n.100.
22 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 19, at 308; Kraakman, supra note 19, at 61 n.20, 94.
23 See Kostant, supra note 21, at 1239. For example, the independence of a director
may only exacerbate the informational asymmetries that already exist. Outside
directors “devote but a small portion of their time and effort to the firm.” Bainbridge &
Johnson, supra note 17, at 310; see also Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils
of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1250 (2003) (noting that directors have information
gathering problems because they only meet a few times a year). Therefore, they can
have difficulty understanding the inner workings of the company they are charged with
monitoring. See Eliot Spitzer, Keynote Address, Symposium: Enron and Its Aftermath, 76 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 801, 807 (2002).
24 See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner
Circles, 83 OREGON L. REV. 435, 460 (2004); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs,
and Informational Monopolies, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1349-50 (2005).
25 Information blocking and filtering occurs when information is withheld by
subordinates, and “communication upward [is] highly filtered and correspondingly
inaccurate.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1144 (1977);
Kostant, supra note 21, at 1239-40. This blocking and filtering has numerous causes,
including: (a) a shared feeling on the part of subordinate officials that they owe their
loyalty chiefly to senior management and not to the board; (b) a belief that the board is
interested only in “hard” quantitative information, such as capital costs, financial ratios,
and expected rates of return; (c) a sense that “everybody knows anyway,” coupled with
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worst circumstances, corporate executives may affirmatively hide
and misrepresent information in order to evade a monitor’s
oversight. Thus, flow-of-information problems can arise because
these traditional corporate monitors do not have enough
information, and because they often have distorted and filtered
information.
These problems contributed to the failure of traditional
monitors to detect the wrongdoing at the center of the recent
corporate scandals.26 Certainly the greed of corporate executives
triggered the massive fraud,27 and traditional corporate monitors
should have been more active in their oversight responsibilities.28
Other systemic issues also contributed to this unprecedented
failure in corporate governance.29 There is sufficient blame to go
around.30 Yet, as discussed below, one of the most glaring (yet
the perception that the board would rather not be put on formal notice as to the ugly
“facts of life” of doing business abroad; and (d) a “lack of congruence” between the
interests of the corporation and the career aspirations of individual corporate officials.
See Coffee, supra, at 1131; see also Linda Klebe Trevino, Out of Touch: The CEO’s Role in
Corporate Misbehavior, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1209-10 (2005) (describing research
regarding the distortion and filtering of information from subordinates to superiors in
hierarchical organization).
26 The failings of the traditional monitors in these scandals, particularly with
regard to Enron, have been exhaustively detailed elsewhere. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note
19, at 313-15; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1125-43 (2002); John R.
Kroger, Enron, Fraud and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective, 75 U. COLO.
L. REV. 57, 59-60 (2004).
27 See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 280-81; Greg Ip, Greenspan Issues Hopeful Outlook as
Stocks Sink, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2002, at A1 (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan in July 16, 2002 speech in which Mr. Greenspan blamed an “infectious
greed“ for the corporate scandals); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate
Thermostat: Lessons from Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving Others
and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 286 (2004) (“Indeed, unrestrained
greed has now become the standard trope in the social construction of these events.”).
28 Fanto, supra note 24, at 435-36; O’Connor, supra note 23, at 1235-36; Powers
Report, supra note 2, at 22, 148.
29 Systemic explanations for the corporate scandals include: the perverse
incentives provided by managerial stock options for corporate officers to inflate a
corporation’s stock price, see Coffee, supra note 19, at 304; a “bubble atmosphere” fueled
by new business techniques and a lack of investor skepticism, see Ribstein, supra note 17,
at 281; the legislative undermining of private securities liability through, among other
things, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995; see andré douglas pond
cummings, “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the 1994 Republican Revolution and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act Contributed to the Collapse of the United States Capital
Markets, 83 Neb. L. Rev. 979, 1044 (2005); and a judicial tightening of burdens of proof
for demonstrating aiding and abetting liability in violation of federal securities law, see
id. at 1023-24 & 1048 n.320 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)).
30 See Kroger, supra note 26, at 59-60; Paredes, supra note 18, at 503 (“Many things
contributed to Enron’s demise. There were breakdowns all around – accountants,
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under-analyzed) facts regarding the scandals is that the
information concerning the fraudulent conduct was available to
rank-and-file employees for years. This information, however,
either never made it to the traditional corporate monitors or was
so filtered that it did not inspire any of the monitors to end the
misconduct until shareholders lost millions of dollars of value in
their investments.31
B. Overcoming Information Problems - Employees as Corporate
Monitors
Corporate employees could be instrumental in solving these
information problems.
Employees have an information
advantage over traditional corporate monitors because they have
more complete knowledge regarding the inner workings of a
large corporation.32 Financial misconduct on the scale that
occurred during the recent corporate scandals virtually requires
the assistance of low and mid-level employees because of its scope

lawyers, securities analysts, and credit rating agencies (the ‘gatekeepers’); the SEC, and
the board of directors, not to mention the underlying corporate misconduct. Even the
‘victims’ – the investors – bear some responsibility for seemingly, perhaps
understandably, becoming complacent after historic bull markets and failing to ask the
tough questions of Enron’s management that should have been asked.”).
31 To some extent, this problem is not new. During corporate scandals in the
1970s relating to corporate bribery of public officials, Professor Coffee noted significant
problems with information flow to the board of directors. See Coffee, supra note 25, at
1127-28. Corporate officers systematically kept information about the bribery from the
board of directors, and the hierarchical structure of the corporation cut off subordinates
who attempted to raise red flags. See id. at 1133-34. Writing in the early 1980’s, Alan
Westin also lamented the harmful results that occurred when corporate management
blocked information from employees regarding illegalities taking place within the
corporation. See Alan F. Westin, Introduction: Why Whistle Blowing Is on the Rise, in
WHISTLE-BLOWING: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 1, 10-12 (Alan Westin ed.,
1981) [hereinafter Westin, Introduction].
32 Although the statement that employees have better information about corporate
conduct than outside monitors seems rationally based on common sense, Ralph Nader
put it nicely in his early work on corporate whistleblowers:
Corporate employees are among the first to know about industrial
dumping of mercury or fluoride sludge into waterways, defectively
designed automobiles, or undisclosed adverse effects of prescription
drugs and pesticides. They are the first to grasp the technical capabilities
to prevent existing product or pollution hazards. But they are very often
the last to speak out, much less to refuse to be recruited for acts of
corporate or governmental negligence or predation.
Ralph Nader, An Anatomy of Whistle Blowing, in WHISTLE BLOWING: THE REPORT
CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 4 (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1972).

OF THE
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and complexity.33 Additionally, even if an employee does not
participate in the wrongdoing, corporate accounting and finance
employees who are trained in the proper methods of conducting
business should recognize when corporate actions fall outside
legal boundaries.34 In fact, even with few corporate or legal
incentives provided to whistleblowing employees, roughly onethird of frauds and other economic crimes against businesses are
reported by whistleblowers.35 Thus, given their central role in
corporate activity, information from rank-and-file employees is
essential to uncovering wrongdoing in a timely way.
Accordingly, effectively encouraging rank-and-file employees to
disclose their knowledge of wrongdoing is a critical step in
discovering fraud and other corporate misconduct.
1. The Few Who Succeeded
Unlike the traditional corporate monitors during the recent
scandals, some corporate employees successfully identified and
reported the corporate fraud, particularly at WorldCom, Kmart,
and several mutual funds companies. These whistleblowing
employees succeeded for two reasons. First and foremost, they
simply spoke out and disclosed their inside knowledge regarding
misconduct occurring inside their corporation. Second, the
successful whistleblowing employees spoke out effectively by
disclosing their information directly to traditional corporate
monitors rather than to corporate executives.
The most famous example of a successful individual
employee whistleblower may be Cynthia Cooper, who was the
head of internal auditing at WorldCom.36 Cooper uncovered
manifold illegal accounting practices at WorldCom in 2002 and
reported the illegalities directly to WorldCom’s Board of
Directors.
The Board publicly admitted the financial
manipulations and fired WorldCom’s CFO Scott Sullivan, who
allegedly orchestrated the fraud and tried to stop Cooper’s

33 See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 374 (2003); Ribstein, supra note 17, at 286.
34 Richard Alexander, The Role of Whistleblowers in the Fight Against Economic Crime,
12 J. FIN. CRIME 131, 131 (2004).
35 See Brickey, supra note 33, at 365 n.37 (citing study reported in Jonathan D.
Glater, Survey Finds Fraud’s Reach in Big Business, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2003, at C3).
36 See Amanda Ripley, The Night Detective, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 45, 46-47.
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investigation.37 By reporting Sullivan’s misconduct directly to the
Board, Cooper successfully avoided his attempt to block
disclosure of the fraud.38
Other whistleblowers similarly were effective because they
disclosed information directly to the government, another
traditional corporate monitor.39
For example, separate,
anonymous whistleblowers uncovered fraud at Symbol
Technologies and Kmart when they sent letters to government
regulators.40 More recently, the mutual fund industry paid
hundreds of millions of dollars to settle charges arising out of
allegations made by employee whistleblowers to government
investigators regarding improper practices in the industry.41

37 See id. at 49. WorldCom ultimately filed for the largest bankruptcy in American
history. See Ken Belson, WorldCom’s Audacious Failure and Its Toll on an Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at C1.
38 Ethics hotlines also helped whistleblowers succeed. At Duke Power, a call from
an employee whistleblower to the company’s ethics hotline in July 2001 led to the
company’s payment of a $25 million fee to state regulators. See Melissa Davis, Enron
Aside, Whistle-Blowers Still Withering, THE STREET.COM, at http://www.thestreet.com/
stocks/melissadavid/10090120.html (May 29, 2003).
39 To be sure, some whistleblowers also were successful because they disclosed
information directly to the public, either through the media or an individual lawsuit.
For example, a former Dynegy employee gave papers about “Project Alpha” – a
financial vehicle implemented by Dynegy to exaggerate cash flow and reduce taxes – to
the Wall Street Journal, which led to an SEC civil securities-fraud case that the company
settled for $3 million, a shareholder lawsuit, and resignations of senior executives. See
Jathon Sapsford & Paul Beckett, Whistle-Blower Reels from Actions’ Fallout, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, at http://www.careerjournaleurope.com/myc/survive/20021217sapsford.html
(Dec. 17, 2002). Also, after receiving allegations in a whistleblower lawsuit about
marketing fraud related to its relationship to Burger King, The Coca-Cola Company
conducted an internal investigation and ultimately offered to pay Burger King $21
million to compensate for the frauds. See Alix Nyberg, Whistle-Blower Woes, CFO, Oct.
2001, at 51, 52.
40 In April 2001, an anonymous whistleblower sent a letter to the S.E.C. alleging
that Symbol Technologies engaged in improper accounting. After three years of
government and internal investigations, Symbol restated earnings for five years and the
government indicted seven former senior executives for accounting fraud. See Steve
Lohr, Ex-Executives at Symbol are Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2004, at C1. In its
restatements, Symbol reduced revenue by $234 million and net income by $325 million.
See id. Symbol also settled investor and S.E.C. lawsuits for $138 million. See id. In
January 2001, an anonymous whistleblower sent a letter about corporate wrongdoing to
Kmart’s board and to government officials that resulted in at least two criminal
indictments, allegedly based upon improperly recording payments to overstate Kmart’s
earnings. See Constance L. Hays, 2 Ex-Officials at Kmart Face Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2003, at C1.
41 See Jayne O’Donnell, The Guy Who Blew the Whistle on Putnam, USA TODAY, at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/funds/2003-11-20-whistleblower-1a-cover_x.
htm (Nov. 20, 2003). Putnam Investments alone paid nearly $194 million to settle claims
that investors were hurt by the practice of market timing. See Jon Chesto, Mass. Market:
Whistle-blower Law Needs Updating; No One Rewarded in 5-Year History, PATRIOT LEDGER, at
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These whistleblowing employees themselves could not stop
misconduct, but by providing information directly to traditional
monitors, the employees circumvented the barriers corporate
executives erected to shield external monitors from the
misconduct.
2. The Many Who Failed
The success of these few individual whistleblowers, however,
highlights the overall failure of corporate employees to identify
and successfully report the wrongdoing occurring in these
companies and others, such as Enron. Two primary failures
occurred – failures that were the inverse of the successes
discussed above.
a. Failing to Speak Out
First, unlike the few successful individual whistleblowers, the
vast majority of knowledgeable employees failed to reveal
wrongdoing because they were unable or unwilling to speak out.
The misconduct at many of the corporations affected by the
scandals occurred over a period of several years.42 During this
time, rank-and-file employees certainly participated, at some
level, in the improper practices that led to the fraud.43 For
http://ledger.southofboston.com/articles/2005/07/09/news/news06.txt (July 9, 2005);
Meet a Major-League Whistleblower, CBSNEWS.COM, at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/07/07/60II/printable628000.shtml (July 7, 2004).
42 For example, the fraud at Enron was ongoing for at least four years before the
company filed for bankruptcy in December 2001. See Powers Report, supra note 2, at 2, 32.
The amounts involved in the restatement are staggering. As set forth in the Powers
Report, the restatement:
reduced Enron’s reported net income by $28 million in 1997 (of $105
million total), by $133 million in 1998 (of $703 million total), by $248
million in 1999 (of $893 million total), and by $99 million in 2000 (of $979
million total). The restatement reduced reported shareholders’ equity by
$258 million in 1997, by $391 million in 1998, by $710 million in 1999, and
by $754 million in 2000. It increased reported debt by $711 million in
1997, by $561 million in 1998, by $685 million in 1999, and by $628 million
in 2000.
Id. at 3. The HealthSouth fraud may have lasted as long as fifteen years, see Kurt
Eichenwald, Key Executive at HealthSouth Admits to Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at
C1, and “ranks as one of the biggest, and perhaps the most blatant, in corporate
history.” See Melissa Davis, HealthSouth Spotlight Turns to Ex-Auditor, THESTREET.COM, at
http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/melissadavid/10089204.html (May 22, 2003).
43 At Enron, for example, the misrepresentations and the improper accounting
practices that led to Enron’s bankruptcy were long-standing and well-known
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example, when corporate executives at Enron made outlandish
profit predictions, employees knew they must “gin [up]” earnings
and revenues to match the predictions.44 Thus, executives may
have hatched accounting scams, but often their underlings were
sent to do the dirty work of executing the plan, despite the
underlings’ knowledge that such accounting was illegal.45
Furthermore, even if employees did not directly participate in
the fraud, employees often knew that something in the
corporation was amiss. At Enron, for example, knowledge about
the company’s earnings manipulation was so widespread that
employees joked about it at company parties.46 For months prior
to Enron’s bankruptcy filing, numerous employees knew that
executives’ public statements about Enron’s financial strength
were not true and that the company’s business was failing.47
However, despite their lengthy exposure to flawed financial
practices and public misrepresentations, few employees came
forward to complain.48 Importantly, this phenomenon was not
unique to Enron: the majority of employees who witnessed
wrongdoing did not report it.49 Successful whistleblowers, by
definition, overcame this inherent hesitation to speak out.

throughout the company. See, e.g., MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 116; 182-83
(giving examples of employee knowledge of Enron’s practice of inflating sales
numbers); 219-20; 230; 269-70 (discussing wide-spread employee knowledge and
participation in various strategies to manipulate California’s energy market); 303-04;
332.
44 See id. at 289.
45 See Davis, supra note 42 (noting that the CFO of HealthSouth admitted to
directing the company’s auditing staff to inflate the company’s earnings.); Kenneth N.
Gilpin, Ex-Rite Aid Officials Face U.S. Charges of Financial Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2002,
at A1 (noting that the indictment of the CFO for Rite Aid alleged that he coordinated the
accounting fraud by “instructing less-senior employees in the accounting department to
make unsupported entries in the company’s books and records that did not meet
generally accepted accounting principles”).
46 See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 296.
47 See, e.g., ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 24647 (2002); MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 230; 303; 332.
48 There are exceptions, of course. In March 2001, one Enron employee sent an
anonymous letter to Fortune magazine to complain that company executives were
understating the extent of recent job cuts. See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 332.
49 Several studies have found low reporting rates among employees who witness
misconduct. See, e.g., MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 96-99; TERANCE D. MIETHE,
WHISTLEBLOWING AT WORK: TOUGH CHOICES IN EXPOSING FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE ON
THE JOB 31 (1999); Estlund, supra note 9, at 119-20; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at
332-33 (surveying 6 studies of whistleblowing and finding that the average rate of
whistleblowing is 42%).
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b. Executive Blocking and Filtering
A second flow-of-information failure occurred because, even
if employees spoke out, their disclosures of wrongdoing often
were ineffective. Rather than report misconduct to traditional
corporate monitors, failed whistleblowers disclosed information
to corporate executives, who subsequently prevented it from
reaching official monitors.
Executives either blocked the
information entirely or filtered the information before it reached
the traditional monitors to avoid alerting the monitors to the
misconduct.50 These problems were apparent at many of the
companies involved in the corporate fraud;51 however, the fraud
at Enron presents the clearest, and most well documented,52
examples.
At the core of the Enron fraud were “massive accounting
fraud and irregularities, a principal feature of which was the use
of structured finance techniques designed to get debt off Enron’s
balance sheet and inflate Enron’s profits.”53 During the course of
this fraud, Enron executives successfully blocked many employee
complaints regarding improper or illegal business tactics by
responding to any complaint with hostility and obfuscation.54

See Mitchell, supra note 24, at 1313-14.
For example, in August 2001, a Global Crossing vice president for finance wrote
the company’s Chief Ethics Officer claiming that the company was engaging in
improper accounting techniques. See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED 362-63 (2003).
The top executives at the company never sent this letter to its Board or its auditors. See
id. at 363.
52 See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152
U. PENN. L. REV. 1517, 1518 n.4 (2004) (listing the “staggering amount of scholarship on
Enron”); Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How Enron’s
Public Image Morphed from the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the Most
Notorious Company Ever, in FIASCOS, supra note 18, at 77, 87 (noting that since Enron’s
bankruptcy filing, Enron books “have become their own cottage industry”); id. at 87 n.36
(listing dozens of books published about Enron); see generally Powers Report, supra note 2
(investigative report by special committee of the Enron Board of Directors).
53 Paredes, supra note 18, at 503.
54 See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 135; 149-50; 294; MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at
308-09; Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm, in CORPORATE FIASCOS,
supra note 18, at 927, 937 (“Those who objected often found themselves the subject of
pressure, downright abuse, and exile.”); Tim Mcguire, More Than Work: Many Yelled
‘Fire!’ at Enron, But Deceit Drowned Them Out, WINSTON-SALEM J., Aug. 21, 2005, available
at
http://www.journalnow.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=WSJ/MGArticle/
WSJ_BasicArticle&c=MGArticle&cid=10311784558108 (“That was a clear pattern at
Enron: If anyone suggested wrongdoing, they were considered a hindrance and
ousted.”). From the earliest studies of whistleblowers, researchers have described
anecdotal evidence of management hostility to underlings who report wrongdoing as
typical of reactions to whistleblowers. See, e.g., Alan F. Westin, Conclusion: What Can and
Should Be Done to Protect Whistle Blowers in Industry, in WHISTLE-BLOWING: LOYALTY AND
50
51
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From the company’s earliest days, Enron executives silenced and
undermined employees who raised concerns about Enron’s
accounting and financial practices.55 This information blocking
grew increasingly problematic by the late 1990s, when employees
repeatedly complained to Enron’s risk assessment group and
corporate executives about the off-balance sheet “special purpose
entities” that became the center of the Enron scandal.56 These
complaints never made it to the Board of Directors, which, on
three separate occasions, waived Enron’s Code of Ethics and
approved the conflicts of interests these entities created.57 Enron’s
Board never substantively investigated the propriety or long-term
impact of these entities.58 Furthermore, in early 2001, as Enron’s
businesses began to show signs of strain, a few employees
reported to corporate executives that large losses were being
hidden.59
Executives disregarded these reports and never
completed internal investigations.60 At least one employee wrote
a signed letter to Enron’s management and the Secretary of the
Board in which she detailed the misrepresentations about Enron’s
earnings.61 The letter, however, was never shown to Enron’s
Board of Directors.62
Even if employees avoided management’s information
blocking, corporate executives often filtered and slanted employee

DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 131, 132 (Alan Westin ed., 1981) [hereinafter Westin,
Conclusion]; Westin, Introduction, supra note 31, at 10-12.
55 See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 38-42 (describing actions by Ken Lay in late 1980’s to
cover up internal reports regarding falsified bank statements and illegal payments to
corporate officers); MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 94-95 (describing 1994 complaints
by Jim Alexander regarding internal accounting issues).
56 See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 160; 226; 231; MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 19293; 308-09; Powers Report, supra note 2, at 166-67 (describing complaints by Jeff McMahon
to Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s President and COO, regarding the failure of controls to
protect Enron from Andrew Fastow’s conflict of interest in created the special purpose
entities).
57 See Paredes, supra note 18, at 503; Powers Report, supra note 2, at 148-65. As
Professor Paredes noted, by utilizing these special purpose entities that he individually
controlled, Enron’s CFO, Andrew Fastow, “stood to make millions by, essentially,
negotiating against Enron.” Paredes, supra note 18, at 503. The Board hardly discussed
this massive conflict of interest or how to monitor it. See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note
3, at 193. There is no indication that internal employee concerns with the arrangements
ever reached the Board. See id.
58 See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 164-65; 228-29.
59 MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 298-304 (describing internal investigation of
Enron Energy Services by Wanda Curry, an Enron accountant, which uncovered
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of “unacknowledged, speculative trading losses”).
60 Id.
61 See id. at 358-59.
62 See id. at 359.
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information towards executives’ goals before the information
reached the traditional corporate monitors. For example, Sherron
Watkins, the famed Enron whistleblower,63 actually was
unsuccessful in stopping Enron’s fraud because the information
she disclosed about misconduct at Enron was sanitized before it
reached the Board of Directors. Watkins’ error was that she
complained to Enron’s CEO, Kenneth Lay, rather than to the full
Board of Directors.64 Lay subsequently hired the law firm of
Vinson & Elkins to investigate the allegations – the very same law
firm that approved many of the transactions about which Watkins
complained.65 When the Board ultimately learned of Watkins’
allegations, the report was whitewashed by Vinson & Elkins’
conclusion that the transactions Watkins reported were proper.66
Thus, by hand-picking his friends at Vinson & Elkins to
investigate Watkins’ claims, Lay successfully filtered Watkins’ full
allegations from reaching the Board and the public, at least
temporarily.67 Although Watkins certainly deserves credit for

63 Watkins was named, along Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom, as one of Time
Magazine’s People of the Year in 2002. See Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of
the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 32, 32-33.
64 In August 2001, Watkins reported her concerns regarding the accounting
problems to Lay, first in an anonymous letter and subsequently in a meeting with Lay.
See Cherry, supra note 8, at 1036 & 1036 n.31; Leslie Griffin, Whistleblowing in the Business
World, in FIASCOS, supra note 18, at 209, 210-11. Watkins presciently warned of her
concern that Enron might “implode in a wave of accounting scandals.” Memorandum
from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth Lay, Aug. 15, 2001, available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/02142002Hearing489/tab10.pdf. For
a more lengthy description of Watkins’ role, see BRYCE, supra note 47, at 293-99, and
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 354-58.
65 See Griffin, supra note 64, at 213-14; Powers Report, supra note 2, at 173. Lay
justified this choice by concluding that the investigation would only be “preliminary”
and could be conducted most quickly by V&E because the law firm was “familiar” with
Enron. See Powers Report, supra note 2, at 173. However, as noted by Enron’s own
Board-led investigation after the bankruptcy filing, “[t]he result of the V&E review was
largely predetermined by the scope and nature of the investigation and the process
employed.” See id. at 176.
66 See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 366; Powers Report, supra note 2, at 175.
At the Board meeting, a Vinson & Elkins attorney “assured the audit committee that [the
Watkins letter] wasn’t a problem; his preliminary investigation had already concluded
there was no need to look any further. No Enron director asked to see Watkins’s letter . .
. and there was no specific discussion of her concerns about the [special purpose
entities].” MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 366.
67 Ultimately, of course, Watkins unveiled much of Enron’s “fuzzy” accounting to
the government during her testimony to Congress in February 2002. See The Financial
Collapse of Enron: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 17 (2002) (Testimony of Sherron Watkins).
However, these public disclosures occurred only after Enron filed for bankruptcy in
December 2001 and Congress discovered her initial memo to Lay. See Powers Report,
supra note 2, at 32.
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being willing to step forward and report her concerns to Enron’s
CEO, ultimately she was not effective as a whistleblower because
she provided information to Enron’s executives rather than
directly to Enron’s Board.68
Finally, any conceivably problematic information that did
make it to Enron’s traditional monitors often was discounted or
ignored based upon the close relationship between the monitors
and Enron executives.
Enron’s Board, although ideally
69
independent on paper, never effectively questioned Enron’s
management regarding its financial practices.70
Moreover,
“gatekeepers,” such as Enron’s outside accountants and attorneys
who received huge amounts of fees from Enron, did not raise red
flags to anyone on Enron’s Board even though they knew that
Enron’s aggressive accounting techniques were problematic.71
The close relationships between purportedly independent
monitors and Enron’s executives led to “group think” that
prevented
them
from
dispassionately
fulfilling
their
responsibilities and questioning what they were being told.72 Had
these monitors received unfiltered information from employees,
however, they might have been forced to fulfill their oversight
responsibilities in spite of their close relationship with Enron’s
management.

68 Despite the public accolades she received, Watkins ineffectiveness as a
whistleblower has been criticized. In his well-regarded book regarding the collapse of
Enron, Robert Bryce entitled his chapter on Watkins “Sherron Watkins Saves Her Own
Ass.” See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 293; see also Griffin, supra note 64, at 220-21; Dan
Ackman, Whistleblower?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2002, at A10.
69 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2002);
Peter C. Kostant, Sarbanes-Oxley and Changing the Norms of Corporate Lawyering, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 542 (2004).
70 See Kostant, supra note 69, at 542.
71 See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 298; Powers Report, supra note 2, at 17, 24-26; see also
Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 17, at 301 (“All too often, lawyers acted as facilitators
and enablers of management impropriety.”); Coffee, supra note 19, at 313-15 (discussing
accountants’ role); Gordon, supra note 69, at 1237 (same); Gordon, supra note 26, at 1138
(noting that lawyers had “the capacity to create endless shells under which to hide and
move the peas”); Developments in the Law – Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2227, 2227 (2004) (“Lawyers’ negligence almost certainly contributed to the wave of
corporate scandals that shook the securities markets in 2001 and 2002.”).
72 See Fanto, supra note 24, at 441-42, 446-49; O’Connor, supra note 23, at 1257-93.
“Group think” involves a “culture of silence” in which corporate leaders discourage
critical discussions and influence from individuals outside of the corporate “inner
circle.” Fanto, supra note 24, at 469; see also O’Connor, supra note 23, at 1242-55
(asserting that whatever information is received by directors often is analyzed in the
context of norms of building board cohesiveness that make it difficult to test and
question what is being told to them).
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Most commentators ignored corporate employees’ role in
these scandals and, instead, blamed the failures of the traditional
corporate monitors for the success of the deceptions.73 In part,
this blame is well deserved: the duties of traditional corporate
monitors to investigate potential misconduct are more
pronounced and formalized, and their authority to intervene is
more apparent, than the duties and authority of rank-and-file
employees. However, thousands of employees, participated in,
knew about, or willfully ignored the massive misconduct
occurring within their companies.74 As important, even if
employees were not direct participants, they certainly knew
information that could have been useful to corporate monitors,
perhaps leading to earlier discovery of the fraud. To resolve the
information problems raised by the corporate scandals, the
potential of corporate employees to assist in corporate monitoring
should not be ignored. Part of the response to the corporate
scandals should be to encourage more employees to become
whistleblowers and also to encourage more effective
whistleblowing by assisting employees in avoiding the problem of
blocking and filtering of information by corporate executives. The
remainder of this Article examines whether the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act imposes the best means of implementing these goals.
III. TWO WHISTLEBLOWER MODELS
Versions of both the Anti-retaliation Model and the Structural
Model existed before and during the corporate scandals, yet
neither encouraged employees to disclose information about
corporate fraud consistently and effectively. In 2002, Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to address many of the corporate
governance inadequacies brought to light in the wake of the

See, e.g., Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 17, at 301 (blaming attorneys); Fanto,
supra note 24, at 435-36 (corporate directors); Coffee, supra note 19, at 313-15 (outside
auditors).
74 See, e.g., Neal E. Boudette & Joann S. Lublin, Delphi Discloses New Irregularities in
Its Accounting, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2005, at A3 (noting that although Delphi Corp.’s
treasury staff “was aware of the [undisclosed] off-balance sheet debt,” no one reported it
to the company’s CEO, the board of directors, or credit-rating agencies). After the
scandals, recovering corporations realized the danger of having employees who remain
silent in the face of financial misconduct. New management at both WorldCom (now
known as MCI) and Tyco fired employees and executives who likely knew about
financial improprieties. See Joseph McCafferty, Adelphia Comes Clean, CFO MAGAZINE,
available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3011051/1/c_3036074?f=insidecfo (Dec. 1,
2003).
73
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corporate scandals.
As part of this legislation, Congress
implemented versions of both models.75
A. Insufficiency of the Anti-retaliation Model
The anti-retaliation provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act76 was
widely praised by academics, who called it the “gold standard” of
whistleblower
protection77
and
“the
most
important
whistleblower protection law in the world.”78 For the first time,
millions of employees would be protected by a national statute
against retaliation.79
The Act provides a broad definition of retaliation. Employers
may not “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any
other manner discriminate” against whistleblowers.80
The Act also provides extensive remedies.
Discharged
employees may be reinstated and may receive compensatory
special damages, including litigation costs and attorneys’ fees.81
Furthermore, individuals may be criminally prosecuted for

75 The other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley alter corporate governance on many
fronts. Among other things, the Act established a Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board to govern accounting firms, established rules regarding auditor and
director independence, enhanced the requirements for financial disclosures, increased
criminal penalties for certain white-collar crimes, and altered responsibilities for various
corporate players, such as audit committees, corporate attorneys, corporate officers, and
securities analysts. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (codified in scattered sections of the United States Code).
76 The anti-retaliation provision is part of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act of 2002, which is Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See id. § 806
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A). Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provisions have been
thoroughly described and analyzed in other places. See generally KOHN, supra note 8, at
59-118 (analyzing legal requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provision);
Vaughn, supra note 8, at 8-99 (same). Accordingly, I will only briefly outline its
provisions here.
77 See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUMBIA L. REV. 319, 376 (2005).
78 Vaughn, supra note 8, at 105; see also KOHN, supra note 8, at xii (stating that the
whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are “the most systematic whistleblower
protection framework enacted into federal law”). But see Cherry, supra note 8, at 1034
(concluding that Sarbanes-Oxley is a “half-measure” and not the true reform that
securities law needs to respond to corporate fraud).
79 See Vaughn, supra note 8, at 3.
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
81 See id. § 1514A(c); see also KOHN, supra note 8, at 111 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley
is one of only four federal statutes that permit recovery of attorney fees as part of
“special damages” that must be awarded); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 94 n.400 (noting
benefits of reinstatement as a remedy).
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retaliating against whistleblowers, which seemingly would
further deter potential retaliation.82
Unlike under many federal anti-retaliation statutes,
employees may bring private causes of action in federal district
court if they are subject to retaliation. Although an employee’s
claim must first be brought to the Department of Labor
(specifically, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
or OSHA), a court claim may be brought if the administrative
process is not completed within 180 days,83 which it almost
certainly will not be.84
Yet, Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provision suffers from
significant defects. The Act protects only employees of public
corporations and only if they report violations of federal securities
laws.85 Its statute of limitations period of ninety days is
unreasonably short.86 Further, the remedies do not include any
sort of punitive or liquidated damages to provide extra
encouragement for employee whistleblowers.87 Finally, jumping
through the administrative hoops of OSHA before being able to
bring a claim in federal district court88 can be “cumbersome rather

82 See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (providing for fines and/or imprisonment of up to 10
years for retaliating against a person for providing a law enforcement officer with
truthful information relating to commission of a federal crime).
83 See id. § 1514A(b). Sarbanes-Oxley assigned responsibility for whistleblower
investigations to the Department of Labor. The Department of Labor subsequently
assigned the responsibility to OSHA, which also conducts whistleblower investigations
under several other federal statutes.
84 See Allen v. Stewart Enterp., Final Decision and Order Dismissing Appeal, ARB
Case No. 05-059 (Aug. 17, 2005), at 3 n.5 (noting that complainants dismissed their
appeal in order to file in federal district court and stating that “[a]s is the usual case, the
180-day period for deciding the case had expired before the Complainants filed their
petition with the Board”); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 88. The complete administrative
process includes an initial OSHA investigation, review by an Administrative Law Judge,
and final review by the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor. 29
C.F.R. §§ 1980.104, .107, .110 (2005). Given the current caseload for OSHA, the initial
investigation alone can take almost 180 days. The average time between the filing of a
Sarbanes-Oxley complaint with OSHA and the issuance of a report by the OSHA
investigator was 130 days for Fiscal Year 2005. See Email from Nilgun Tolek, OSHA
Office of Investigative Assistance, to Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb.
College of Law (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file with author). This time period has grown
significantly longer since the enactment of OSHA: in Fiscal Year 2003, the average length
of a Sarbanes-Oxley investigation was 92 days. See id.
85 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
86 See id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
87 See id. § 1514A(c).
88 See id. § 1514A(b); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.101,.103, .104 (2005).
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than expeditious, biased rather than expert, [and] ineffective
rather than efficient.”89
These statutory restrictions likely contribute to the low
success rates of employees who bring claims under SarbanesOxley. Of the 480 cases resolved at the initial investigative level
by December 31, 2005, OSHA investigators found only 17 to have
merit, while another 68 settled.90 The percentage of meritorious
and settled cases for Sarbanes-Oxley is slightly lower than the
percentage of successful claimants for other whistleblower
statutes administered by OSHA,91 perhaps meaning that the
“stronger” whistleblower protections of Sarbanes-Oxley are not
resulting in more protections for whistleblowers.92 Moreover, of
the 119 investigator decisions that were appealed by April 28,
2005, the Department of Labor’s Administrative Law Judges
(ALJs) decided in favor of employees only four times, while
another nineteen settled.93
Indeed, the decisions being issued by the ALJs are
exacerbating
Sarbanes-Oxley’s
statutory
shortcomings.
Procedural issues eviscerate claimant’s cases. Several decisions
dismissed complaints because the wrong corporate entity was
named94 or because a corporation filed a registration statement
with the SEC, but withdrew it before it became effective, thus
denying coverage under the Act.95 Claims have been dismissed
for missing the ninety-day statute of limitations window,96

89 Robert G. Vaughn, State of Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower
Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 621 (1999).
90 See Email from Nilgun Tolek, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to
Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file
with author).
91 See Email from Nilgun Tolek, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to
Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (July 11, 2005) (on file
with author). Interestingly, OSHA considers cases that have settled to be meritorious,
and thus includes settled cases in its successful rate. See id.
92 Another contributing factor may be that employees are testing the outer
boundaries of this new statute in the early years after its enactment. After basic
questions regarding jurisdiction and applicability are answered by Administrative Law
Judges and the courts, it may be that the success rate increases.
93 See Email from Todd Smyth, Office of Administrative Law Judges, to Richard
Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (July 8, 2005) (on file with
author).
94 See, e.g., Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-11
(Dep’t. of Labor July 6, 2004) (dismissing complaint for failure to name both publicly
held parent company and its subsidiary).
95 See Roulett v. Am. Capital Access, No. 2004-SOX-78 (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 22,
2004).
96 See, e.g., Lawrence v. AT&T Labs, No. 2004-SOX-65 (Dep’t of Labor Sept. 9,
2004); Kingoff v. Maxim Group L.L.C., No. 2004-SOX-57 (Dep’t of Labor July 21, 2004).
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including claims that missed the deadline by less than two
weeks97 or because the date on which the limitations period began
to run was the date the employer gave the employee two weeks’
notice rather than the date the whistleblower’s employment
actually terminated.98 ALJs routinely reject equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations.99 ALJs dismissed other claims because
whistleblowers made complaints about the wrong topics, such as
underpayment of employees,100 racial discrimination,101 or
environmental violations,102 rather than securities fraud.
These problems with Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation
provision reflect larger problems with the Anti-retaliation Model.
First, anti-retaliation provisions in general do not provide realistic
encouragement for employees to become corporate monitors,
because they focus on protection only after a disclosure is made.103
Surveys demonstrate that most employees are unaware of the
protections they may (or may not) receive should they report
wrongdoing.104 Moreover, even if an employee is aware that a
disclosure might be protected, it is exceedingly difficult to
determine the extent of any protection because there is little
consistency among whistleblower statutes.105
Whether a
whistleblower is protected depends upon the employee’s state of
residence, the industry in which the employee works, the type of
misconduct reported,106 the type of retaliation endured,107 and, for

97 See Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., ARB Case No. 04-1120, ALJ Case No. 2004-SOX00054 (ARB Aug. 31, 2005); Hopkins v. ATK Tactical Sys., No. 2004-SOX-19 (Dep’t of
Labor May 27, 2004).
98 See Flood v. Cedant Corporation, 2004-SOX-16 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 23, 2004).
99 See Halpern, ARB Case No. 04-1120, ALJ Case No. 2004-SOX-54; Harvey v.
Home Depot, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-20 (Dep’t of Labor May 28, 2004); Flood, ARB Case No.
04-069, ALJ Case No. 2004-SOX-16.
100 See Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-35 (Dep’t of Labor June 10, 2004).
101 See Harvey, No. 2004-SOX-20.
102 See Hopkins, No. 2004-SOX-19.
103 See, e.g., C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL
POWER 108-13 (2001); MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 66, 153-56; MIETHE, supra note 49, at
133; Elletta Sangrey Callahan, et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches
to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 879, 908-09 (2004); Terry Morehead
Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MNC’s, Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 457, 474 (2002).
104 See MIETHE, supra note 49, at 54.
105 See 148 CONG. REC. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(“[C]orporate employees who report fraud are subject to the patchwork and vagaries of
current state laws.”).
106 States vary widely in the type of protections they provide. See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 34-7-1 (2005); Goodroe v. Ga. Power Co., 251 S.E.2d 51, 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978). Others,
like New Jersey, have a broad reaching statute protecting any whistleblower who
reports any violation of law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19 (2005). Federal law protects
only whistleblowers who report certain types of violations in certain industries, and the
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some laws, the willingness of administrative agencies to enforce
the law.108 Sarbanes-Oxley only adds to this confusion.
The second failure of the Anti-retaliation Model is that it does
not address the flow-of-information problems revealed by the
recent scandals. Even if whistleblowing occurs and is protected,
the model does not produce effective whistleblowing, because
rarely do anti-retaliation laws indicate to whom an employee
should make a disclosure. Therefore, although an employee may
be protected from retaliation by reporting to a supervisor or
corporate executive, the actual corporate misconduct may not stop
because the traditional corporate monitors may never receive the
information. As discussed above, in order for whistleblowers to
act effectively as part of the corporate monitoring system,
employees must be able to report misconduct to those with the
authority and responsibility to end it rather than to a supervisor
who might block or filter the information. The Anti-retaliation
Model simply does not address this issue.
To be clear, anti-retaliation provisions are important from a
fairness perspective because they provide ex post protections to
people who should not be hurt for engaging in socially beneficial
conduct.
Some surveys report that well over half of
whistleblowers experience some sort of retaliation.109 Other
researchers place the actual number much lower;110 nonetheless,
the results of retaliation can be devastating. Whistleblowing

extent of the protection varies depending on the statute. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. KOHN,
CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 79-80 (2001); MICELI & NEAR, supra
note 6, at 233-34.
107 Some laws protect employees only if they are discharged and do not address
other forms of retaliation. See, e.g., White v. State, 929 P.2d 396, 407 (Wash. 1997)
(limiting retaliation suit to cases in which employee was actually or constructively
discharged).
108 See Estlund, supra note 9, at 122 n.92.
109 See, e.g., Gerald Vinten, Whistleblowing – Fact or Fiction: An Introductory
Discussion, in WHISTLEBLOWING – SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 3, 11 (Gerald
Vinten ed., 1994) (citing study concluding that 86 of 87 whistleblowers experienced
retaliation); ALFORD, supra note 103, at 18-19 (citing studies in which 1/2 to 2/3 of
whistleblowers lose their jobs); Brickey, supra note 33, at 365 & 365 n.35 (citing nonscientific survey of 200 whistleblowers by National Whistleblower Center finding that
over ½ had lost their jobs and survey by Government Accountability Project that 90% of
whistleblowers experienced retaliation or threats).
110 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 203 (suggesting that generalizing about rate
of retaliation is difficult because of variables in studies and citing study in which less
than 20% of whistleblowers were retaliated against); Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet
Near, A Better Statutory Approach to Whistleblowing, 7 BUS. ETHICS Q. 1, 5 (1997) (arguing
that studies show that most whistleblowers do not suffer retaliation, even though most
people think they do).
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employees have been found dead or beaten.111 Whistleblowers
often lose their jobs, and as a result, their marriages may be
affected, they may lose their homes, and financial ruin might
ensue.112 In short, the Anti-retaliation Model is necessary.
However, it is not sufficient to address the flow-of-information
problems that arose during the recent scandals.
B. Ineffectiveness of Pre-Scandal Versions of the Structural Model
In contrast to the Anti-retaliation Model, the Structural Model
focuses on encouraging and supporting whistleblowing before any
disclosure is made. The Structural Model is based on the
understanding that whistleblowing becomes easier and more
acceptable when corporations provide an authorized and visible
channel for employees to report misconduct.113 Unlike the Antiretaliation Model, which, to be utilized at all, assumes an
adversarial relationship between the employee whistleblower and
the employer, the Structural Model encourages employees to
become part of the corporate monitoring system, thus working in
concert with the corporation rather than at odds with it. The
Structural Model encourages employees by signaling the extrinsic
social and employment benefits of playing within the system and

111 Although it has been difficult to connect such events to the employee’s
whistleblowing activities, examples of atrocities inflicted upon whistleblowers abound,
including the death of Karen Silkwood, see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 464 U.S. 238
(1984), and more recently, the beating of an employee of Los Alamos National
Laboratory shortly before he was to testify before Congress regarding alleged fraud at
the lab, see Bradley Graham & Griff Witte, Whistle-Blower at Los Alamos Attacked in
Parking
Lot
in
N.M.,
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/06/ AR2005060601787_pf.html (July 6, 2005), and the
beating of one of the primary whistleblowers in the mutual fund scandal, see O’Donnell,
supra note 41.
112 See, e.g., Vinten, supra note 109, at 11; ALFORD, supra note 103, at 19-20. Outside
of these extremes, retaliation may take many forms, including “harassment, threats of
termination, suspension, non-promotion, reassignment, transfer, denial of training,
withholding wages or other benefits, closer supervision and scrutiny, or pestering.” Ben
Depoorter & Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing, George Mason Law & Economics Research
Paper No. 04-56, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=622723 (Nov. 15, 2004), at 24; see also
ALFORD, supra note 103, at 31; Baynes, supra note 8, at 895. Even former employees may
face blacklisting from certain industries or from the job market in general. See, e.g.,
Brickey, supra note 33, at 365; Depoorter & De Mot, supra, at 24 & 24 n.95; Miethe &
Rothschild, supra note 9, at 326.
113 Social science research demonstrates that whistleblowing increases when there
is an identifiable, specific means for whistleblowing to occur. See, e.g., Janet P. Near &
Terry M. Dworkin, Responses to Legislative Changes: Corporate Whistleblowing Policies, 17 J.
BUS. ETHICS 1551, 1557 (1998).
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cooperating with the corporation.114 Rather than hoping that an
employee’s report of wrongdoing makes its way through the
managerial hierarchy to an individual with the authority to stop
the misconduct, the Structural Model provides a visible
mechanism for that report and instructs employees to utilize it.
Despite its potential benefits, versions of the Structural Model
in place in both the public and private sectors prior to the
corporate scandals were ineffective. In the public sphere, the
federal government created a structure for whistleblowing
employees to report misconduct in both the Inspector General Act
of 1978 (IGA) and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA).115
Under these provisions, Congress created offices charged with
(among other things) receiving and investigating federal
employee claims of wrongdoing in the government.116 The IGA
required most federal agencies to create a position of Inspector
General who received complaints from that agency’s
employees.117 The CSRA more broadly provided an outlet for
reports from any federal employee by creating the Office of
Special Counsel (OSC).118
The beginnings of the Structural Model can be seen best in the
creation of the OSC. The OSC receives whistleblower disclosures
and informs the necessary federal agency about potential
misconduct occurring within its ranks.119 By informing agencies
of potential problems, Congress hoped that the OSC could
become an “’early warning system’ for budding problems, serious
enough to place agency leadership on notice and to require

See discussion infra Part IV.
See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–12 (2000); Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 111 (1978) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). Both statutes also incorporated the Anti-retaliation
Model by protecting federal employees who report any violations of law, rule, or
regulation, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. app. § 7; 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
116 See 5 U.S.C. app. § 2; 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b), subsequently repealed by Pub. L. 101-12 §
3(a)(8), Apr. 10, 1989, 103 Stat. 21. As part of both Acts, federal employees also
purportedly were protected from retaliation for reporting such misconduct. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8); 5 U.S.C. app. § 7.
117 See id. § 2.
118 See 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(3) (1988), subsequently repealed by Pub. L. 101-12, § 3(a)(8),
Apr. 10, 1989, 103 Stat. 21.
119 See id. § 1206(b)(2); see also Thomas M. Devine & Donald G. Aplin, Abuse of
Authority: The Office of the Special Counsel and Whistleblower Protection, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 5, 52
(1986).
114
115
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acknowledgement.”120 If the OSC believed that a “substantial
likelihood” existed that a whistleblower’s disclosure revealed
potential wrongdoing covered by the statute, then the OSC could
require the head of the agency to conduct an investigation and to
submit a written report regarding the agency’s findings.121 The
OSC would evaluate the report and determine whether the
agency’s findings were reasonable and contained the appropriate
information required by statute.122 Ultimately, the OSC submitted
the agency reports to Congress and the President, and kept a
public file of the report.123 Thus, the CSRA (and the IGA under
similar provisions) went further than simply protecting
whistleblowing employees from retaliation, although they
theoretically did that as well. Congress intended for these statutes
to encourage potential whistleblowers by providing employees
with an easy channel to report misconduct.124
Prior to the corporate scandals, whistleblower disclosure
channels were not imposed upon corporations in the private
sector. Rather, Congress and various courts gave incentives to
organizations to create internal compliance systems, which often
included implementing disclosure channels for employees to
report corporate misconduct.
In 1991, Congress approved the federal Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines (OSG), which utilized a “carrot and stick”
approach125 to encourage organizations to implement an

Devine & Aplin, supra note 119, at 19-20 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. H11822 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Schroeder)).
121 See 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(3)(A) (1988), subsequently repealed by Pub. L. 101-12,
§ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 21 (Apr. 10, 1989).
122 See id. In cases in which the OSC believed that the employee’s information
about misconduct was reasonably supported, the agency’s report had to include a
variety of information, including a summary of the investigation, a listing of any
violation of law, rule, or regulation, and a description of any corrective action taken as a
result of the investigation. See id. § 1206(b).
123 Id. § 1206(b)(5)(A). If the agency failed to submit a timely report, the OSC was
to notify Congress and the President of that failure as well. See id.
124 See Devine & Aplin, supra note 119, at 20 (“The purpose of the OSC
whistleblowing disclosure channel was ‘to encourage employees to give the government
the first crack at cleaning its own house before igniting the glare of publicity to force
correction.’”) (footnote omitted).
125 See Win Swenson, The Organizational Guidelines’ “Carrot and Stick” Philosophy,
and Their Focus on “Effective” Compliance, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 28-29; see also
Dworkin, supra note 103, at 464; Elletta Sangrey Callahan, et al., Integrating Trends in
Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal
Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 190-91 (2002); Near &
Dworkin, supra note 113, at 1557.
120
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“effective program to prevent and detect violations of law.”126
Under the OSG, penalties for corporations convicted of crimes
could be reduced by up to 95% if the corporation previously
implemented such a program; conversely, if no such program
existed, then the potential fines were multiplied by up to 400
percent.127 An “effective program” required that the organization
exercise due diligence to prevent and to detect criminal conduct
by its employees and agents.128 Such due diligence, in turn,
required “having in place and publicizing a reporting system
whereby employees and other agents could report criminal
conduct by others within the organization without fear of
retribution.”129
The judiciary also gave incentives to corporations to monitor
themselves more closely through structural disclosure channels.130
In an influential opinion, Delaware’s Chancery Court opined that
a director of a corporation has a duty to be reasonably informed
about the corporation, a duty which includes implementing an
adequate “corporate information and reporting system.”131 This
holding encourages directors to initiate and maintain a disclosure
channel for employees and agents to inform directors about
problems within the corporation.132 In the sexual harassment
context, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that employers who made
reasonable efforts to deter and correct illegally harassing behavior
may have an affirmative defense available to them against a
sexual harassment plaintiff who has not been subject to a tangible
employment action.133 Furthermore, in a different decision, the
Court held that a corporation may be able to avoid punitive
damages in a wrongful discharge case brought by a whistleblower
if the corporation has an internal reporting mechanism available
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL [hereinafter “OSG”] § 8A1.2
(Commentary), Application Note 3(k) (1991). The OSG were amended after the
corporate scandals in November 2004. See Organizational Guidelines and Compliance,
at http://www.ussc.gov/orgguide.htm (last visited on July 11, 2005) (providing manual
of federal sentencing guidelines and policy statements effective Nov. 1, 2004).
127 See Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing Commission Amendments Encourage a New
Ethical Culture Within Organizations?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 567 (2004).
128 See OSG, supra note 126, § 8A1.2 (Commentary), Application Note 3(k).
129 See id. Application Note 3(k)(5).
130 See Callahan, et al., supra note 125, at 190; Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 480-84 (2001).
131 See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (De. Ct. Chan. 1996). Failure to set up
such a corporate reporting structure may expose the director to breach of fiduciary
charges if the lack of such a system caused a loss. See id.
132 See Dworkin, supra note 103, at 466.
133 See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
126
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to report wrongdoing.134 These court decisions all encourage
corporations to establish whistleblower disclosure channels
because they allow corporations to avoid liability (and its
attendant litigation costs) if sufficient processes are in place.135
Yet, these pre-scandal versions of the Structural Model, like
the Anti-retaliation Model, failed to encourage effective
whistleblowing. One problem was that whistleblower disclosure
systems often did not provide a legitimate outlet for employees to
provide information about misconduct, because the channels
resulted in disclosure to a party who was either non-responsive or
biased.
For example, under the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, corporations could simply fail to respond to
whistleblower complaints because the Guidelines do not specify
to whom whistleblower disclosures must be reported.136 In the
private sector, in order to satisfy the Guidelines, corporations
implemented disclosure channels that flowed up through the
corporate management hierarchy,137 placing employee disclosures
at risk of management blocking and filtering.
The Civil Service Reform Act exemplifies the related problem
of reporting to a biased party. The CSRA’s whistleblowing
channel did not work, in large part because of the anti-employee
bias of a series of Special Counsels who summarily failed to order
investigations of employee complaints.138 Although the first two
Special Counsels used this provision to order agency
investigations for approximately twenty-five percent of employee
complaints, beginning in 1983 a new Special Counsel drastically
reduced the number of investigations ordered, to approximately
7.5% of the complaints.139
In other words, whistleblower
disclosures were being made, but the OSC rarely required
agencies to confront the problems being raised. Ultimately, the
134 See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1999); see also Callahan,
et al. , supra note 125, at 194.
135 See Callahan, et al., supra note 125, at 192-93; Sturm, supra note 130, at 557.
136 See OSG, supra note 126, § 8A1.2, Application Note 3(k)(5).
137 See Andrew R. Apel, A Presentation of Empirical Research on Compliance Practices:
What Companies Say They are Doing – What Employees Hear, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3,
at 125-126; Edward S. Petry, A Presentation of Empirical Research on Compliance Practices:
What Companies Say They are Doing – What Employees Hear, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3,
at 134.
138 Devine & Aplin, supra note 119, at 52. The discretion was magnified because
“no standards of accountability were established for the OSC, the opportunity for
judicial review was minimal, and no private right of action was created by the Act.”
Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting
the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 282 (1991)
(footnotes omitted).
139 See Devine & Aplin, supra note 119, at 53.
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CSRA was amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,
but the unchallenged discretion of the Special Counsel to order
investigations remains,140 leaving in doubt the ability of
government employees to report wrongdoing effectively.141
The second problem with the pre-scandal Structural Model
was that companies had little incentive to implement effective
whistleblower disclosure channels because courts and prosecutors
rarely penalized bad systems or rewarded good ones.
Specifically, corporations easily could create superficial structures

140 The WPA made several changes to the whistleblower disclosure channel
provisions of the CSRA. For example, the WPA now permits a whistleblower to
comment upon an agency’s report after it is submitted to the OSC. See 5 U.S.C. §
1213(e)(1) (1994). This is an important provision because “the whistleblower is often in a
good position to evaluate whether the agency’s response represents a good faith
investigation.” Thomas M. Devine, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundation
for the Modern Law of Employment Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531, 562 n.174 (1999)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-274 at 25 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
WPA also requires that the OSC send these whistleblower comments, the final agency
report, and the OSC’s evaluation to the President and a congressional oversight
committee, and to place them in a public file. See 5 U.S.C. § 1219 (1994); Devine, supra, at
562 n.176. Further, the WPA reduces the risk to whistleblowers themselves by making it
more difficult for the OSC to reveal a whistleblower’s identity. Under the CSRA, the
OSC could reveal a whistleblower’s identity in order to carry out the functions of the
Special Counsel’s office. See 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(1)(1988), subsequently repealed by Pub. L.
101-12, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 21 (Apr. 10, 1989). Under the WPA, the OSC may only identify
a whistleblower without his or her consent if exposure is necessary “because of an
imminent danger to public health or safety or imminent violation of any criminal law.”
5 U.S.C. § 1213(h) (1994); see also Devine, supra, at 563-64 (describing this provision).
Importantly, however, the OSC will not accept anonymous disclosures. The OSC only
will protect the confidentiality of the whistleblower to the extent permitted by Section
1213(h). See U.S. Office of Special Counsel, Whistleblower Disclosures (May 4, 2005), at
www.osc.gov. Of course, this process requires a fair amount of trust in the OSC by a
federal whistleblowing employee.
Despite these changes, the WPA’s focus was on the Anti-retaliation Model, not the
Structural Model. This failure to give sufficient attention to the whistleblower
disclosure channels led one commentator to argue that the WPA “bypassed the process
of maximizing constructive potential from dissent, a curious omission since one of the
WPA’s objectives is to spark increased challenges to bureaucratic misconduct.” Devine,
supra, at 561.
141 The most recent Annual Report from the OSC suggests that the OSC’s
disclosure channel still does not operate consistently to provide a whistleblower’s
information to his or her agency head. From 2002 through 2004, only about 2.6% of
employee disclosures were referred to agency heads for investigation. See REPORT TO
CONGRESS FROM THE U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, 15 (2005),
available at www.osc.gov. The exact percentage is difficult to obtain from the annual
report submitted by the OSC. During FY 2002, 2003, and 2004, the OSC closed 1841
disclosure matters. Id. During those same three years, it referred only 48 matters to
agency heads. Id. The closed matter numbers do not exactly correspond to agency
referrals because there may be some overlap from year to year. However, these raw
numbers present a stark picture of the continued failure of the OSC to serve as the
disclosure clearinghouse envisioned by the CSRA and the WPA.
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merely to satisfy the OSG. These structures often provided
merely “window-dressing” and were not enforced in practice.142
Indeed, the corporate scandals occurred with little outcry from
corporate employees, despite every appearance at the scandalridden corporations that sufficient mechanisms were in place to
encourage the detection and reporting of fraud. For example,
Enron appeared on its face to satisfy the OSG standards for an
effective compliance program, even if the program was not
compliant in reality.143 Moreover, not only were superficial
systems easy to create, but also government provided little
incentive to do anything more. Despite the possibility for
substantial penalty reductions provided by the OSG, the OSG’s
requirement that corporations implement “effective compliance
systems” rarely helped a corporation facing criminal liability.
From 1993 to 2004, only three organizations received a penalty
reduction under the OSG for having an effective system.144
Thus, prior to the corporate scandals, painful weaknesses of
the Structural Model were enforcement and follow-through. In
the private sector, disclosures were directed to corporate
executives rather than traditional corporate monitors, which
restricted information flow. An organization could have an
excellent-appearing disclosure structure in place, but simply
refuse to support it by actually responding to whistleblower
disclosures. Ineffective and unsupported disclosure channels
failed to encourage employees to become whistleblowers and, if
employees did blow the whistle, their disclosures rarely reached
parties willing and able to address them.
C. Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model
Sarbanes-Oxley implemented a new and improved version of
the Structural Model. Under Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the
audit committee of the board of directors of public companies
must establish procedures for receiving complaints regarding
See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The
Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267,
314 (2003-04).
143 See Fiorelli, supra note 127, at 567 & 567 n.10; see also Charles M Elson &
Christopher J. Gyves, In Re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 702 (2004) (noting that Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and Adelphia
each had compliance systems, “none of which, obviously, was very effective”).
144 See Frank O. Bowman, III, Drifting Down the Dnieper with Prince Potemkin: Some
Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in Federal Criminal Sentencing,
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 684 (2004).
142
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accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters.145
Additionally, the audit committee must be able to receive
anonymous disclosures by employees regarding accounting or
auditing matters.146 These requirements significantly alter the
pre-scandal Structural Model in two ways.
First, Sarbanes-Oxley improves the legitimacy of the
disclosure channel. It requires that independent directors on the
board’s audit committee receive whistleblower disclosures. This
direct line to a traditional corporate monitor with the authority
and responsibility to address whistleblower concerns enables
whistleblowers to avoid the blocking and filtering of corporate
executives. As recognized by the SEC when it amended its
general rules and regulations to implement Section 301 of the
Act,147 directors typically rely upon managers of companies to
provide them information, but management “may not have the
appropriate incentives to self-report all questionable practices.”148
Accordingly, the SEC rightfully recognized that “[t]he
establishment of formal procedures for receiving and handling
complaints should serve to facilitate disclosures, encourage
proper individual conduct and alert the audit committee to
potential problems before they have serious consequences.”149
Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley provides for anonymous disclosures,150
which should improve the willingness of employees to come
forward with information. Requiring a legitimate disclosure
channel will unleash the true potential of the Structural Model
and reveal its power to overcome the information problems that
undermined employees’ effectiveness as corporate monitors
during the corporate scandals. The model’s ability to improve
information flow is discussed in the next Part.
Second, for the first time in the private sector, the Structural
Model is imposed broadly rather than merely encouraged.151 The

15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A) (Supp. 2002).
Id. §78j-1(m)(4)(B).
147 See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Nos. 33-8220; 3447654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Release] (promulgating 17
C.F.R. § 240.10A-3, including subsection (b)(3) related to procedures for complaints).
148 Id. at 18,798. In light of the tremendous malfeasance by managers during the
corporate scandals, this seems like somewhat of an understatement.
149 See id.
150 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B) (Supp. 2002).
151 The Structural Model also has been imposed in specific instances through
consent decrees and other settlements by government agencies. For example, in a
consent decree with the SEC, Qwest Communications agreed to install a chief
compliance officer, with reporting obligations to a committee of outside directors, who
is responsible for responding to employee reports about misconduct. See SEC Charges
145
146
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Act instructs the Securities and Exchange Commission to direct
the national securities exchanges and national securities
associations (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange and the National
Association of Securities Dealers) to prohibit the listing of any
security of a company that is not in compliance with this
requirement.152 The penalty for noncompliance with Section 301
(and the corresponding listing rules) is delisting, which obviously
can harm corporations and their shareholders significantly.153
Although Sarbanes-Oxley mandated the implementation of
the Structural Model, Congress did not mandate any specific
requirements for the details of such a reporting system.
Moreover, the SEC did not require specific procedures when it
promulgated rules implementing Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandate,
despite the fact that commentators who responded to the
proposed rule “were split” over how specific the SEC should
be.154 The majority of commentators on the SEC rules argued that
the rules should give audit committees the flexibility to develop
individualized procedures to receive complaints because of the
diversity of companies affected by the Rule.155 The SEC based this
minimalist regulatory approach on the diverse needs of a variety
of corporations, arguing that corporations themselves
should be provided with flexibility to develop and
utilize procedures appropriate for their circumstances.
The procedures that will be most effective to meet the
requirements for a very small listed issuer with few
employees could be very different from the processes
and systems that would need to be in place for large,

Qwest Communications International Inc. with Multi-Faceted Accounting and Financial
Reporting Fraud, SEC Litigation Release No. 18935 (Oct. 21, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18936.htm (cited in Marc I. Steinberg &
Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure When the Whistle Blows in the
Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 30 J. CORP. L. 445, 456 n.90 (2005)). With regard to
discrimination complaints, courts also have been active in approving corporate
structural reform to address accusations of systematic bias within individual
corporations. See Sturm, supra note 130, at 509-19, 557 (describing system mandated by
consent decree involving Home Depot).
152 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A) (Supp. 2002).
153 See Comments of Stanley Keller, Chair-Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities, Section of Business Law, American Bar Association (Feb. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/skeller1.htm (“Delisting is a remedy
with significant adverse consequences both to the issuer and its shareholders.
Realistically, the failure to conform to a corporate governance listing standard in one
primary market will leave no alternative comparable trading opportunity available for
the company.”).
154 See SEC Release, supra note 147, at 18,798.
155 See id.
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multi-national corporations with thousands
employees in many different jurisdictions.156

of

Following the SEC’s lead, both the New York Stock Exchange and
the NASDAQ merely required that their listed companies have
audit committees that complied with the SEC’s Rule.157
Sarbanes-Oxley thus responded to the failings of the prescandal Structural Model in two ways. First, the Act implemented
a whistleblower disclosure channel that provides information
directly to independent corporate directors. As described in the
next Part, this change directly addresses the flow-of-information
problems demonstrated by the corporate scandals. Second,
Sarbanes-Oxley mandated the implementation of a disclosure
channel in every public corporation. Although this mandatory
implementation is an improvement, I suggest in Part V of this
Article that Sarbanes-Oxley’s minimalist approach fails to address
key potential problems with the model.
IV. THE POWER OF SARBANES-OXLEY’S STRUCTURAL
MODEL
As utilized by Sarbanes-Oxley, the Structural Model should
encourage more effective whistleblowing than the Anti-retaliation
Model or previous versions of the Structural Model. SarbanesOxley’s Structural Model overcomes the flow-of-information
problems exposed by the recent scandals by implementing a
legitimate whistleblower disclosure channel.
Through its
legitimacy, the channel encourages employees to become active
corporate monitors and to disclose corporate misconduct. As
important, this channel facilitates the movement of this
information from the employees – the corporate players with the
most information – to the traditional corporate monitors – the
corporate players with the power and responsibility to utilize the
information effectively. Thus, the Structural Model’s power lies
in its ability to increase both the amount and the effectiveness of
disclosures from whistleblowing employees.
A. More Disclosures
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model should increase the
amount of whistleblowing because it provides incentives for
See id.
See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A (Nov. 3, 2004); NASD Rules, §
4350(d)(3) (2005).
156
157
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employees to become whistleblowers and reduces several of the
most significant disincentives to whistleblowing. By contrast, the
Anti-retaliation Model provides little, if any, incentive to blow the
whistle and addresses, somewhat poorly, only one disincentive to
whistleblowing – the fear of retaliation.
Studies demonstrate that designating a uniform recipient of
whistleblower complaints in an organization and directing
employees to that recipient is associated with increased amounts
of whistleblowing.158 Perhaps one reason for this increased
whistleblowing is that employees become whistleblowers out of a
sense of loyalty to their organization.159 Contrary to popular
belief regarding the traitorous nature of such “snitches,”
whistleblowers often are employees with long tenure who believe
they serve the organization’s best interests by providing
information about organizational wrongdoing.160
The
whistleblowers involved in the recent corporate scandals seem to
satisfy this documented generalization. Both Sherron Watkins of
Enron and Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom profess (albeit selfservingly) to being driven by their sense of loyalty to their
organizations and appear truly disappointed that greedy
corporate officers destroyed the organizations they admired.161
An internal disclosure channel provides a way for employees to
demonstrate their loyalty by disclosing misconduct without
having to report colleagues to “outside” authorities.

158 See Karen L. Hooks, et al., Enhancing Communication to Assist in Fraud Prevention
and Detection, 13 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 86, 93 (1994).
159 As Cass Sunstein has noted with regard to people who dissent publicly:

There is an ironic point here. . . . Conformists are often thought to be
protective of social interests, keeping quiet for the sake of the group. By
contrast, dissenters tend to be seen as selfish individualists, embarking on
projects of their own. But in an important sense, the opposite is closer to
the truth. Much of the time, dissenters benefit others, while conformists
benefit themselves.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 6 (2003).
160 See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 103, at 79-80; MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 16970; David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicial
Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 115 (1995); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note
138, at 300-01.
161 See Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 63, at 32 (asserting that Watkins and Cooper,
along with Coleen Rowley of the FBI, are the “truest of true believers . . . ever faithful to
the idea that where they worked was a place that served the wider world in some
important way”); Ripley, supra note 36, at 47-49 (describing Cooper’s reaction to
discovery of WorldCom’s fraud); Jodie Morse & Amanda Bower, The Party Crasher,
TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 53, 53 (Watkins’s reaction).
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A disclosure channel harmonizes with the tendency of
employee whistleblowers to report misconduct internally162 – a
tendency that seems driven by the whistleblower’s sense of
loyalty. Sherron Watkins reported her misgivings to Ken Lay, but
not publicly until she was called to testify before a House
committee investigating Enron’s bankruptcy. Cynthia Cooper
reported her findings first to WorldCom’s CFO and then to the
company’s Board of Directors. A similar pattern emerged in the
scandals at Xerox, Global Crossing, Duke Power, and in the
mutual funds scandal, whereby an employee attempted to resolve
a problem internally so that the company could fix it and remain
viable.163 In fact, this type of structure fits well with the psyche of
the American employee, whose sense of loyalty to the
organization keeps her from reporting misconduct externally but
who may be willing to report internally if encouraged by the
organization.164
In addition to providing an incentive to whistleblowers by
encouraging loyalty, the Structural Model should reduce the most
visible disincentives to whistleblowing behavior. For example,
the model should reduce the amount of retaliation against
whistleblowers because the model focuses on the recipient of a
whistleblower complaint rather than on the whistleblower.
Studies demonstrate that the recipient of complaints plays a large
role in determining both the outcome of that particular complaint
and whether subsequent whistleblowers will feel free to come

162
See, e.g., MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, THE
WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 195 (1989);
KAREN L. SOEKEN & DONALD R. SOEKEN, A SURVEY OF WHISTLEBLOWERS: THEIR STRESSORS
AND COPING STRATEGIES 160 (1987); Callahan, et al., supra note 125, at 195; Dworkin &
Callahan, supra note 138, at 300–01; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 335–37;
Gregory R. Watchman, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers: A New Corporate Early Warning
System,
at
8
(Nov.
2004),
available
at
http://www.whistleblower.org/doc/GAP%20Analysis%20Sarbanes%2DO
xley%2Epdf.
163 See note 38 supra (Duke Power); note 51, supra (Global Crossing); Christine
Dugas, Whistle-Blower Tells Story of Mutual Fund Scandal, USA TODAY, May 26, 2005,
available
at
http://www.yourlawyer.com/practice/printnews.htm?story_id7377
(mutual funds); O’Donnell, supra note 41 (mutual funds); Whistleblowing: Peep and Weep,
THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2002, available at http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/
3002918?f=options (Xerox). This tendency is clear in Watkins’ letter to Ken Lay, in
which she attempted to present solutions for Enron to “fix” the accounting
improprieties she discovered. See Letter from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth Lay, available
at http://energycommerce.house.gov/0107/Hearings/02072002hearing485/tab17.pdf.
164 Coffee, supra note 25, at 1242 (asserting that encouraging external
whistleblowing may be ineffective because it is so ingrained in corporate mentality to be
loyal and to withhold adverse information).
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forward.165 By requiring that the top echelon of a corporation
receive complaints, whistleblowers are more likely to have
support from upper levels of the corporation. This “top-down”
support will reduce the amount of retaliation felt by employees,
and therefore encourage more whistleblowing.166 Further, this
structure allows whistleblowers to avoid conflicted supervisors or
high-ranking managers who are likely to feel defensive about
wrongdoing occurring in their department.167 Additionally,
because Sarbanes-Oxley permits employees to report wrongdoing
anonymously or confidentially, employees’ fear of retaliation
should be minimized.168 Thus, the Structural Model implemented
by Sarbanes-Oxley reduces the significant deterrent of retaliation
in a different, and perhaps more effective, manner than the Antiretaliation Model.169
Behavioral studies of whistleblowers demonstrate that a
larger disincentive to whistleblowing than fear of retaliation is
employees’ concern that nothing will be done in response to their
complaints.170 This concern was justified during the latest
corporate scandals, as employees in scandal-ridden companies
routinely watched those who broke the law receive promotions
and raises.171 Understandably, employees are usually unwilling
to take the tremendous career and social risks associated with
whistleblowing if their report has little potential to change the
status quo. While the Anti-retaliation Model does little to reduce

See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 77.
See Marcia P. Miceli, et al., Can Laws Protect Whistle-Blowers? Results of a
Naturally Occurring Field Experiment, 26 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 129, 134, 143-44 (1999).
167 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 184.
168 Not surprisingly, studies consistently demonstrate that individuals are more
willing to state a dissenting viewpoint if they can do so anonymously. See MIETHE, supra
note 49, at 54-57; SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 20. Permitting such anonymous reporting
does have downsides: often such reports are not as trustworthy and there is little
opportunity for feedback or follow-up. However, to the extent the Anti-retaliation
Model is not working effectively, anonymous reporting may encourage those who are
otherwise reluctant to speak out for fear of retribution.
169 The Structural Model also reinforces the Anti-retaliation Model. As a practical
matter, retaliating against a whistleblowing employee will be significantly more difficult
if the employee utilizes an internal reporting structure. The employee’s disclosure will
be documented and any subsequent employment action against the employee most
likely will trigger extra review by the corporation.
170 See Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 333-37 (citing survey responses to
assert that a primary reason employees do not blow the whistle is because the employee
believes that nothing will be done to correct the activity); see also MICELI & NEAR, supra
note 6, at 65-66; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 302, Hooks, et al., supra note 158,
at 93.
171 See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 139, 153-54, 187 (describing promotions
and raises for Andrew Fastow, Ken Rice, and Ben Gilson at Enron).
165
166
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this disincentive, the Structural Model addresses it by requiring
that disclosures go directly to the board of directors. This
structure increases the odds of a positive corporate response to
the information because the directors are corporate monitors with
a fiduciary duty to address misconduct.172 Rather than simply
providing information to a manager and hoping someone with
actual authority receives it, the Structural Model guarantees that
the appropriate corporate leaders will consider it.
Corporate and societal pressures to remain quiet are
additional disincentives to whistleblowing. Corporations push
employees into going along with illegal actions in order to be
“loyal” to the organization.173 Furthermore, society discourages
individuals from being “squealers” and betraying loyalties.174
Arguably, it simply may be human nature to conform to group
norms and to gain acceptance from our peers.175 The broad
employee silence during the corporate scandals is strong evidence
of the existence of this behavioral norm.
Judges and other decision-makers may be hesitant to impose
stiff criminal and civil sanctions upon managers who use
retaliation to enforce this norm, thus making the norm especially
“sticky” and difficult to overcome.176 To paraphrase Dan Kahan’s
theory regarding sticky norms in general, sometimes a “gentle
nudge” like the Structural Model may be more effective in
altering sticky norms than “hard shoves” like the Anti-retaliation
Model.177 In other words, the Structural Model provides a more
moderate reform that is less likely to alienate the very people
charged with encouraging whistleblowing. This more temperate
approach may subtly alter corporate norms of secrecy and

See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
For example, a whistleblower at Fannie Mae recently stated that other
employees did not report wrongdoing at the company because of Fannie Mae’s
corporate environment, which he described as “one of intimidation, restraint of
dissenting opinions, and pressure to be part of the ‘Team,’ giving [corporate officers] the
numbers [they] desired to please the markets.” See Peter Eavis, Fannie’s Hedging Deals
Look
Thorny,
THESTREET.COM,
at
http://www.thestreet.com/comment/detox/10187363.html (Oct. 15, 2004).
174 See Estlund, supra note 9, at 123; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 333-37.
175 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 9; Cunningham, supra note 142, at 317; John M.
Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1189-92 (2005).
176 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000) (describing the “sticky norms problem”
whereby “the presence of a social norm makes decisionmakers reluctant to carry out a
law intended to change that norm”).
177 See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 176, at 608; see also Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 114 U. PENN. L. REV. 1697, 1730-31 (1996).
172
173
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retaliation to make open communication more viable.
Implementing a whistleblower disclosure channel will signal to
employees that the management and ownership of the firm are
committed to corporate ethics.178 Although enforcement of the
use of the channel is limited,179 the mere existence of the channel
may demonstrate to employees that reporting misconduct is
appropriate and expected.180
Sarbanes-Oxley may be specifically influential in this regard
because it mandates that the board of directors receive
whistleblower disclosures, a structure that signals the importance
of this type of employee monitoring and reporting.181 As a result,
the actual behavior of directors, managers, and employees may
change because they have a more formal role in preventing
corporate fraud.182 This requirement, in turn, may encourage
these corporate officers to become more committed to the norm of
open communication.183 Employees, in turn, will take their cue
not only from the existence of the structural disclosure channel,
but also from the acceptance of the channel by their managers and

178 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 30 (arguing for the importance of creating a
culture that “welcomes disagreement and that does not punish those who depart from
the prevailing orthodoxy,” and suggesting that creating “channels by which dissent can
be expressed anonymously” might encourage such a culture); Brett H. McDonnell, Sox
Appeals, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 530 (2004) (asserting that “norms of good behavior
can be as important a limit on managerial misbehavior” as other disciplinary
mechanisms).
179 Enforcement is geared toward requiring the existence of the channel, not
towards regulating its use. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j1(m)(1)(A) (Supp. 2002); 17 C.F.R. §240.10A-3(a).
180 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PENN. L. REV.
2021, 2032 (1996) (arguing that even an under-enforced law may serve an expressive
function that can alter behavior in signaling “appropriate behavior and in inculcating
the expectation of social opprobrium and, hence, shame in those who deviate from the
announced norm”).
181 See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with the Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 104 (2002) (“If the firm’s
commitment to certain behaviors can be communicated successfully, this should be a
strong pull. And if other agents publicly signal their adherence to the policy, conformity
pressures will go to work as well. A positive compliance culture will evolve.”); cf.
Estlund, supra note 77, at 375 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley plays an important role “by
protecting and institutionalizing employee whistleblowing”). Cf. MICELI & NEAR, supra
note 6, at 144.
182 Cf. Kostant, supra note 69, at 556-58 (arguing that corporate lawyers may
become better corporate watchdogs because of their more formalized role under
Sarbanes-Oxley). Professor Kostant’s arguments that Sarbanes-Oxley may change the
social norms for attorneys seems equally applicable to effect a more formalized structure
for reporting misconduct may have on altering the social norm against whistleblowing
that exists in many corporations. Cf. id.
183 See Kahan, supra note 176, at 635-36.
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supervisors.184 This changing social attitude can cascade and
expand until a more pervasive norm develops, one in which
employees understand that reporting misconduct is expected and
encouraged because disclosures ultimately benefit the
corporation.185
Accordingly, under the Structural Model, not reporting may
actually be seen as disloyal, and those who stand mute in the face
of wrongdoing may be considered defectors from the norm,
subject to social sanctions like ostracism, or even employment
sanctions.186 For example, when WorldCom emerged from
bankruptcy as MCI, the company conducted an intensive internal
investigation and fired fifty employees, many of whom were not
involved in the fraud, but who likely knew about it.187 Structural
encouragements can become self-fulfilling as they are given
legitimacy by legal and human resource professionals within the
corporation.188
As Peter Kostant has argued, “[a] slight
adjustment, or clarification of social meaning, can powerfully
affect norms of behavior.”189
This theoretical approach to social norms finds support in
research regarding influences on whistleblowing behavior.
Studies demonstrate that internal whistleblowing increases when
ethical and legal compliance policies exist in an organization,190
particularly if specific whistleblowing procedures are in place.191
Such reporting procedures give whistleblowers more power by
officially providing encouragement and protection to
whistleblowers.192 Indeed, two of the most prominent social
science researchers of whistleblowing behavior contend that the
best approach for encouraging whistleblowing “would be to set
up internal complaint procedures where concerned employees
could report, and make sure that those procedures provide for
speedy and impartial review.”193
Thus, whistleblowing will increase if attitudes of significant
corporate players and the corporation’s social norms encourage
See id.
See Sunstein, supra note 180, at 2033 (discussing the development of “’norm
cascades’ as reputational incentives shift behavior in new directions”).
186 See id. at 2029-30.
187 See McCafferty, supra note 74.
188 See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401, 1406–17 (1990).
189 See Kostant, supra note 69, at 553.
190 See Trevino, supra note 25, at 1198-1201.
191 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 150.
192 See id. at 223.
193 Id. at 249; see also Dworkin, supra note 103, at 474.
184
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it.194 Indeed, it is commonly argued that, in order to encourage
whistleblowers, corporations need to develop a more ethical and
open corporate culture, implemented from the top of the
organizational hierarchy.195
Yet, other than relying upon
enlightened corporate leaders, specific recommendations
regarding how society can implement such a corporate culture are
rare because it is difficult (if not impossible) for the government to
mandate a culture of honesty. Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model
might provide a means of encouraging the development of such
an ethical corporate culture by mandating both a process for
whistleblowers to follow and a high-level recipient for
whistleblower disclosures.
There are obvious limitations to the ability of the Structural
Model to turn employees into corporate monitors. Like any
corporate monitor, employees suffer from cognitive biases that
may inhibit them from spotting and reporting wrongdoing. For
example, in the face of ambiguous evidence of wrongdoing,
employees tend to interpret information to avoid conflict.196 Also,
employees have a “cognitive conservatism” that makes it difficult
to readjust one’s perspective to account for new information,197
particularly if, as some theorize, corrupt corporate behavior
begins with acts that are only minimally improper, which then
gradually expand into larger acts of wrongdoing.198 When
combined with a bias for the status quo and a tendency to
perceive information as normal rather than abnormal, employees
face difficulties as corporate monitors.199
These difficulties
suggest that employees should not be a corporation’s sole source
of monitoring. But, employees can, and should, be one part of the
overall corporate monitoring system. As part of that system, a
visible and legitimate whistleblower disclosure channel that
encourages and rewards the reporting of misconduct may cause
employees to give credence to their own concerns by challenging
their inherent assumptions and biases. The structure of an
effective disclosure channel will reduce disincentives to coming
forward by reducing corporate and societal pressures to remain
194

326.

See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 158-60; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at

See Westin, Conclusion, supra note 54, at 143-49.
See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 86-87 (describing this tendency as “motivated
inference”).
197 See id.
198 See Darley, supra note 175, at 1186-88.
199 See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 86-90 (discussing these same attributes as
they apply to whether supervisors can capably monitor employees to prevent
wrongdoing).
195
196
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quiet. When implemented along with anti-retaliation protections,
the Structural Model should encourage more whistleblowing from
corporate employees.
B. Less Blocking and Filtering
A second significant benefit of the Structural Model is that it
should increase whistleblowers’ effectiveness, because the model
provides a channel for employees to give information directly to
the board of a corporation. An unimpeded avenue to the
directors allows whistleblowers to bypass the information
blocking and filtering by corporate executives and other
managers. Moreover, because it is relatively unfiltered, the
information from someone outside of the corporate governing
circle may prompt directors to critically examine the information
they receive from the corporate managers. The independent
directors on the audit committee “have a tremendous reputational
stake in compliance with the law, and almost no countervailing
financial stake in its violation . . . [therefore, they] are likely to
insist on correcting internal problems rather than covering them
up.”200 Providing reports to the traditional monitors, particularly
the board of directors, will be the key to the model’s success.
Furthermore, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model makes it
more difficult for directors to ignore the information received
from these employees.201 One problem with the traditional
monitoring system is that it relies upon enforcement of fiduciary
duties for monitors through a liability system that makes it
extremely difficult to prove breach of a fiduciary duty of care
unless direct knowledge of wrongdoing is demonstrated. Thus,
the traditional system encourages directors to avoid receiving
information about potential misconduct in the corporation
because there is no breach of fiduciary duty when the directors
have no direct knowledge of wrongdoing. The Structural Model
makes it more difficult for directors to avoid the type of
knowledge that requires action in order to fulfill their fiduciary
duties.
Most whistleblowing systems provide effective
documentation of information passed from an employee to the
responsible monitor. Indeed, after the corporate scandals, the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were amended to require
that the organization’s “governing authority,” (most likely the
board of directors) must have knowledge about, and exercise

200
201

Kostant, supra note 69, at 556.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 71, at 2247 n.134.
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reasonable oversight of, the compliance program.202 Part of this
oversight must include receiving annual reports from individuals
who are operationally responsible for the program.203 Similarly,
under Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model, directors could not
claim – as they did with Enron – that they were unaware of
potential misconduct. Although directors may still ignore or
underestimate the information because it comes from a source
outside of their small group,204 they will do so at their own peril.
At a minimum, a disclosure channel forces directors to confront
officers with the information or be liable for their failure to do so.
In this way, the Structural Model reinforces the already-existing
duties and obligations of the traditional monitors.
Thus, by circumventing the blocking and filtering of corporate
executives, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model will make
whistleblower disclosures more effective in that disclosures to
directors are more likely to cause the corporation to address the
misconduct of its executives and managers.
C. Secondary Benefits
The history of the Structural Model demonstrates that it must
have some organizational acceptance in order to work. For
example, the disastrous reign of two Special Counsels eviscerated
the disclosure provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act because
they did not follow through on employee disclosures
effectively.205 For organizational acceptance to occur, the benefits
of this model to the corporation must outweigh its costs. Truly
workable and effective disclosure systems are more likely to be
implemented when the corporation can be convinced that
encouraging whistleblowers is in its best interest. Fortunately,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model could provide significant
benefits directly to the corporation.
1. Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing
An important benefit for corporations is that the Structural
Model encourages internal whistleblowing.206 When an employee

OSG, supra note 126, § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (2004); Application Note 1.
Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C); Application Note 3.
204 See Fanto, supra note 24, at 460-72.
205 See discussion supra Part III.B.
206 See DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
171 (1991) (“Employees may be less likely to complain outside their organizations if they
202
203
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reports wrongdoing internally rather than externally, corporations
learn about mistaken employee views and perspectives before
these mistaken views are made public, after which they are harder
to correct.207 This early detection allows corporations to avoid
costs related to the negative publicity and government
intervention that follows external whistleblowing.208 It also gives
corporations the opportunity to correct misconduct earlier and
thereby save costs related to future litigation.209 Further, internal
whistleblowing may attract whistleblowers who are loyal to the
corporation and thus are motivated to improve the corporation –
as compared to whistleblowers who report externally and may
have more negative motivations. These whistleblowers also are
less likely to experience retaliation when they report internally
rather than externally.210
One criticism of encouraging internal whistleblowing is that it
may not be beneficial for society because misconduct is more
easily hidden and covered up if it is reported internally.211
However, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model should reduce this
negative aspect of internal whistleblowing by directing
whistleblower reports to corporate monitors with fiduciary duties
to investigate and with significant exposure for failing to disclose
any material misconduct they discover.212
Moreover, the
Structural Model does not prohibit external whistleblowing – it
simply facilitates internal whistleblowing in order to encourage a
greater overall amount of whistleblowing.

believe that their companies have effective internal mechanisms for expressing dissent
and achieving change.”); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 300-02.
207 See Callahan, supra note 103, at 882, 904-06; Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet
Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 243 (1987);
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 299-300; Vaughn, supra note 89, at 599.
208 See Callahan, supra note 103, at 882, 904-06; Dworkin & Near, supra note 207, at
242.
209 See Culp, supra note 160, at 124, 132; Robert G. Vaughn, et al., The Whistleblower
Statute Prepared for the Organization of American States and the Global Legal Revolution
Protecting Whistleblowers, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 857, 868 (2003).
210 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 302; Dworkin & Near, supra note
110, at 6.
211 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 284; Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful
Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1966-68 (1996).
212 See Cherry, supra note 8, at 1073 (noting that the reporting channel of SarbanesOxley would provide evidence for government investigators and plaintiff’s attorneys
regarding corporate knowledge of wrongdoing).
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2. Better Corporate Decision-Making
To the extent that a corporation truly implements structural
changes that improve the flow of information, corporate decisionmaking should improve.213 Boards of directors need to be open to
different and dissenting points of view in order to improve the
quality of their decision-making.214 Evidence from studies of
corporate boards demonstrates that “companies do best if they
have highly contentious boards ‘that regard dissent as an
obligation and that treat no subject as undiscussable.’ Wellfunctioning boards contain a range of viewpoints and encourage
tough questions, challenging the prevailing orthodoxy.”215 In
accordance with this viewpoint, James Fanto suggested
improving the board of directors by appointing outside directors
to play a “whistleblowing” function in order to combat pervasive
“group think.”216 Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model augments
this suggestion by directing actual whistleblowers to disclose
information to the board of directors, thereby providing the board
information with which to make more informed decisions.
On a broader note, the Structural Model also helps encourage
dissent more generally by encouraging employees to speak out
immediately and directly. This process may lead to better
decision-making for the corporation because groups make better
decisions when a variety of viewpoints are considered.217
Without dissent from individuals, groups tend to conform to
more extreme positions – positions not held individually by most
of the members of the group.218 Moreover, dissenters can play an
important role in breaking informational cascades, in which a
group of people uniformly fall in line with a few influential
people who may be mistaken.219 The essential problem with such
cascading is that individuals with a minority view often selfcensor in the face of this group pressure, which keeps valuable
information from the group and leads to inferior decisionmaking.220 Through a disclosure channel, whistleblowers can
See, e.g., MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 228-29.
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 2; O’Connor, supra note 23, at 1304-06; Westin,
Conclusion, supra note 54, at 138-39.
215 SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 2 (internal quotation not cited in original).
216 See Fanto, supra note 24, at 507-09.
217 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 9 (“[C]lose-knit groups, discouraging conflict
and disagreement, often do badly because of this type of conformity. The problem is
that people are failing to disclose what they know and believe.”).
218 See generally id. at 111-44 (discussing “group polarization”).
219 See id. at 66-73.
220 See id. at 118.
213
214
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provide an important dissenting voice which may improve a
corporation’s decision-making, particularly at the board level.
3. Reducing Monitoring Costs
Despite the benefits that whistleblowing can bring to
corporations and to society, whistleblowing – like any monitoring
mechanism – has costs. Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model,
however, minimizes those costs and, where appropriate, reduces
the costs of whistleblowing more effectively than the Antiretaliation Model.
The Structural Model has obvious costs associated with
maintaining a structure to receive, disseminate, and investigate
These costs, of course, will vary
employee disclosures.221
depending upon the complexity of the system,222 and may affect
smaller companies more than larger corporations.223 Interestingly,
though, when the SEC enacted rules implementing the structural
changes of Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley, it did not receive any
specific data in response to its request for information related to
possible costs of such systems,224 perhaps signaling that the cost of
such structures is not overwhelming for public companies.225
In addition to the mechanical nuts and bolts of implementing
a reporting system, opportunity costs must be considered.
Executives and managers who are monitored by employees may
forgo activity that is profitable and legal, but that may put them at
risk of being reported.226 Shareholders may want these executives
and managers to test or even to cross the boundaries of legality

221 See SEC Release, supra note 147, at 18,813 (noting that there will be “ongoing
costs” in establishing procedures for handling complaints and in monitoring compliance
with those procedures).
222 Cf. Matthias Schmidt, “Whistle Blowing” Regulation and Accounting Standards
Enforcement in Germany and Europe – An Economic Perspective, Humboldt Univ. Bus. &
Econ. Discussion Paper No. 29, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=438840 (Aug.
2003), at 26 (noting that for internal whistleblowing rules to be effective, tremendous
company resources may be required, such as continuous training for management and
employees, implementing hotlines, and identifying ombudspersons).
223 See SEC Release, supra note 147, at 18,816.
224 See id. at 18,814.
225 Anecdotal evidence also supports the notion that companies may not find the
cost of certain disclosure systems prohibitive, particularly when compared with the
benefit of increased employee monitoring. See Judy Dahl, Whistle-Blower Program Lets
Employees Speak Up, Credit Union Directors Newsletter (Dec. 2005) (describing
whistleblower hotline implemented by Texas credit union, which the credit union’s
internal auditor called a “bargain”) (on file with author).
226 See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 284; see also MIETHE, supra note 49, at 87 (noting
that over-surveillance of employees can lead to employees that are overly cautious).
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because, at times, it may be more profitable for shareholders if a
corporation violates the law, particularly if the penalties and the
chance of being caught are low.227 Yet, increasing the role of
employees in corporate governance by encouraging monitoring
and reporting may not dramatically increase the opportunity costs
that the corporation already incurs through other monitoring. As
Larry Backer has noted,
[M]uch of the obligations imposed on directors,
officers and gatekeepers, all fall on employees.
Employees are usually the people who actually gather
the information necessary for the functioning of the
due diligence, monitoring, or information systems
mandated by [Sarbanes-Oxley] and related statutes.
Employees tend also to be responsible for first cut
analysis and decisions with respect to the relevance of
particular bits of information. To a large extent, a large
firm must rely on its employees, a large number of
whom must be trusted to gather, analyze and produce
information that is essential for the compliance by
responsible officers, directors and gatekeepers of their
legal obligations.228
While employees already are asked to monitor, organizations fail
to offer an incentive to accurately report their findings to
corporate leadership. Thus, because all monitoring mechanisms
have costs that must be considered in comparison to the costs of
other controls,229 it is noteworthy that the marginal opportunity
costs of encouraging employees to report incidents of misconduct
may not be significant given employees’ current monitoring roles.
Another cost of encouraging whistleblowing (and the
monitoring that goes along with it) is that a corporation may
discover wrongdoing for which it may be liable to some third-

227 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 10 (“[E]thical issues aside, from a
shareholder’s standpoint, illegal acts may be worthwhile if their expected benefits
outweigh their expected costs. In addition, some investors may view managerial
attempts to test the legal waters as preferable to always proceeding in a risk-averse
manner. Wealth-maximizing shareholders may consider it desirable for managers to
occasionally get caught trying to cheat.” (quoting W. N. Davidson & D. L. Worrell, The
Impact of Announcements of Corporate Illegalities, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 195, 198 (1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
228 Larry Catá Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing
Corporate Monitoring after Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 370 (2004).
229 Cf. Kraakman, supra note 19, at 75-87 (discussing costs of legal enforcement
through third-party liability)
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party.230 Having an employee engage in wrongdoing, and then
subsequently exposing the wrongdoing as a company, can bring
financial penalties to a corporation, litigation expenses, negative
publicity, and increased scrutiny by regulators.231 This cost is not
uniform among companies, and will be greater for those
corporations that are engaging in fraudulent activities.232
Assuming most companies are not acting illegally, this overall
cost may be insignificant for the vast majority of corporations.233
Furthermore, these costs may seem higher to corporations
than they are in reality, because managers often confuse their own
personal costs with costs to the corporation. As Richard Painter
notes, “Managers often lose their careers if misconduct is
disclosed, whereas organizations may suffer only temporary loss
of reputation. Managers usually bear the brunt of criminal
liability for misconduct, whereas organizations do not go to
jail.”234 In short, corporations may actually receive benefits from
getting caught earlier (because less wrongdoing occurs), but
managers may underemphasize these benefits because getting
caught gives managers significant legal exposure.235 This agency
failure – whereby managers “overemphasize costs and
underemphasize benefits” of getting caught236 – should make the
Structural Model more attractive to shareholders to the extent it
increases corporate compliance and facilitates earlier detection of
corporate fraud.
An additional source of costs from a whistleblower system
comes from likely error, including intentional error by purported
whistleblowers.
Whistleblowers could use the system
opportunistically to gain some sort of job security by disclosing
imaginary misconduct,237 to achieve an advantage in promotion
Cf. Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search
of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 224 (1995) (noting that an
obvious cost to clients of engaging an attorney who will be a whistleblower is the “cost
of misconduct being exposed”).
231 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 282; see also ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON,
WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS – AND WHY 75 (2003).
232 See Painter, supra note 230, at 224, 263.
233 See id. at 224.
234 Id. at 263-64. Of course, management turnover may impose its own costs, such
as replacement costs and a “loss of cohesion within the organization.” See Langevoort,
supra note 27, at 295-96.
235 See Painter, supra note 230, at 263-64.
236 See id. at 264-65.
237 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 7; Ribstein, supra note 17, at 286; Schmidt,
supra note 222, at 21; Westin, Conclusion, supra note 54 at 134. The costs here mirror the
typical list of costs that are asserted regarding any restriction on a corporation’s ability
to fire its employees at-will. See James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the
230
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or salary by wrongly reporting a co-employee,238 or simply to hurt
the employer in retaliation for some perceived slight.239
Alternatively, reporting errors could occur simply because an
employee does not fully understand an ambiguous and complex
situation in which it might be difficult to discern legal from illegal
conduct.240 The costs of such erroneous claims include costs
associated with internal investigations, litigation expenses,
opportunity costs, potential penalties, and costs related to
becoming a possible target for government regulators.241
Although incidents of malicious whistleblowing are rare,242
the Structural Model can serve to slightly reduce the costs of
whistleblower errors in general by channeling whistleblower
disclosures internally rather than externally. Although there will
be investigative costs, a corporation that receives erroneous
disclosures internally at least has the possibility of providing
feedback and correct information to a whistleblowing
employee.243 This early response may keep a whistleblower from
going public with flawed information, thus reducing the overall
costs of defending against such charges. Moreover, even if the
mistaken whistleblower makes a public accusation after an
internal accusation, the company will have investigated the
complaints and thus be able to explain publicly the reasons why
those complaints were dismissed after the internal
investigation.244
With regard to workers that intentionally make false claims,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model may actually reduce costs
Economics of Deterrence, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 91, 99, 123 (arguing that inhibiting the right
of employer to fire employee will raise the cost of labor because it reduces the ability to
fire inefficient employees, which makes the employer’s workforce less efficient, and thus
more costly; it will also raise the costs of administrating the employment relationship
because it will lead to spurious claims that increase litigation and administrative
expenses); see generally Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard
Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1988).
238 Cf. Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 142, 421 N.E.2d 876, 884
(1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about protecting whistleblowers in the
workplace because it encourages employees to turn in other employees).
239 See Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee’s Duty of
Loyalty and Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 279, 298 (1971).
240 See id. at 298; Westin, Conclusion, supra note 54, at 134 (“Putting the whistle to
one’s lips does not guarantee that one’s facts are correct.”).
241 See Kraakman, supra note 19, at 60; Gerald Vinten, Enough is Enough: An
Employer’s View – the Pink Affair, in WHISTLEBLOWING – SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP 118-32 (1994) (describing the costs incurred by an employer that
investigated thoroughly but could not substantiate a whistleblower’s claims).
242 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 303.
243 See id. at 304.
244 See Westin, Conclusion, supra note 54, at 150.
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associated with such accusations. Employers likely will document
any whistleblowing disclosures made through the approved
channel as well as any subsequent investigation, which may
lessen the factual “he said/she said” nature of whistleblowing
claims regarding when a disclosure was made, the content of the
disclosure, and the relationship of the disclosure to an
employment action. Moreover, whistleblower disclosures may
never be provided to supervisors who make employment
decisions, thus shielding these supervisors from intentionally
retaliating against a whistleblower.
Furthermore, if it is
necessary, utilizing a whistleblowing structure will enable
corporations to prevent retaliation against users of the system by
frustrated managers, which also will reduce litigation
expenditures.
Finally,
a
common
argument
against
promoting
whistleblowing is that it will undermine corporate culture by
encouraging secrecy, destabilizing management authority, and
diminishing morale.245 Each of these phenomena represents
potential costs for a corporation. Whistleblowing may damage a
corporation’s ability to maintain confidential business
information, thus forcing it to create systems to maintain secrecy
of its vital corporate information.246 It is costly to create these
additional systems, and further costs are imposed because the
systems inefficiently restrict the normal sharing of corporate
information.247
In a related manner, whistleblowing can
undermine the organizational chain of command, which may
reduce the efficiencies gained by having a clear corporate
decision-making structure.248
In fact, any decrease in the
authority of management imposes costs, as managers must spend
additional time justifying themselves and their commands.249
Reduced morale, among both executives and employees, also may
lead to less productivity and efficiency. In its extreme version,
this argument analogizes a culture of whistleblowing to the type
of informing that is encouraged by tyrannical regimes.250

245

9, at 343.

See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 5, at 333; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note

See Blumberg, supra note 239, at 297.
See id.; Kraakman, supra note 19, at 60.
248 See JOHNSON, supra note 231, at 75.
249 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 9-10; see also Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319
A.2d 174, 178 (Pa. 1974) (denying whistleblower claim because whistleblower bypassed
immediate supervisors in his reporting and breached the chain of command; approving
of the company discharging him “to preserve administrative order in its own home”).
250 See Peter F. Drucker, What is “Business Ethics”? (on file with author).
246
247
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Certainly an overly-rigorous surveillance program may lead
to “risk-aversion, frustration and fears about being secondguessed.”251 Yet, the effect of increased encouragement of
whistleblowing on a corporation’s culture is debatable. As an
initial matter, the concern that encouraging whistleblowing will
cause corporate disruption seems to lack demonstrable support in
the extensive social science research regarding whistleblowers.252
As mentioned above, this research supports the opposite
conclusion that whistleblowers typically are loyal employees
dedicated to the organization’s goals.253 Furthermore, most
employees are accustomed to surveillance by managers and other
superiors through performance reviews and evaluative metrics,
such that additional monitoring is unlikely to affect morale
negatively.
Moreover, the Structural Model encourages
whistleblowing within the corporate system, which should work
to maintain corporate secrets rather than reveal them to outsiders.
Sarbanes-Oxley’s emphasis on internal whistleblowing also
should keep the potential for organizational disruptions to a
minimum because it reinforces, rather than undermines, the
corporate hierarchy. By providing information to the board of
directors rather than to corporate management, Sarbanes-Oxley’s
Structural Model emphasizes the primacy of the board of
directors as a regulatory player in the corporate structure.
4. Increasing Employee Voice
Whistleblower disclosure channels also benefit corporate
employees by giving them greater voice through an additional
avenue of participation in corporate governance.254 With union
membership on the decline, the opportunity for employee
participation in the workplace has been greatly reduced, leading
to higher worker turnover and lower worker satisfaction.255
Providing the employee more voice and participation in the

See Langevoort, supra note 27, at 309.
See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 303-04 (summarizing research and
concluding that “[f]ears that internal whistleblowing is disruptive of employee control
and productivity, or that it serves purely private interests, are unsupported by socialpsychological research”) (footnotes omitted).
253 Id. at 303.
254 See Dworkin, supra note 103, at 459; Estlund, supra note 9, at 108 (“[E]mployee
participation in workplace governance is increasingly viewed as both an intrinsic and an
instrumental good.”).
255 See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 29 (1990); Samuel Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104
HARV. L. REV. 607, 624 n.86 (1990).
251
252
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workplace, such as through increased encouragement of
whistleblowing, can lead to longer employee tenure and less
turnover.256 Because work is where people get much of their
“sense of community and self-worth,” increased involvement in
corporate governance is valuable for employees.257 Stability is
also enhanced by the increased morale and loyalty that occurs
“when employees understand that they can stop wrongful
conduct and contribute to shaping a working environment in
which they can take pride.”258 Additionally, corporations benefit
from a cooperative relationship with its employees; such a
relationship increases corporate productivity by encouraging
employees to develop firm-specific skills and increasing employee
efficiency.259
Yet, this relationship between employees and employers
needs structure to develop and to be fully realized,260 and
providing structural encouragement for employee voice through
whistleblowing is a good beginning. Incorporating employees as
part of the corporate governance system is not as anomalous as it
may sound. Suggestions have been made for decades to involve
employees more in corporate governance.261 For example, much
of the union movement has rested upon employees becoming
more involved in their working conditions. The movement to
broaden corporate accountability to its “stakeholders” rather than
only its “shareholders” recognizes employees as important
players in the corporation.262 Although employee-designated

256 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 162–80
(1984); Estlund, supra note 77, at 376; Issacharoff, supra note 255, at 624.
257 See Estlund, supra note 9, at 108.
258 Callahan, et al., supra note 125, at 196; see also MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at
12.
259 See Estlund, supra note 9, at 109. Professor Estlund summarizes the reasons
why a corporation may not implement such structural protections and reforms on its
own, even if they increase productivity. Such reasons include (1) the possibility that
increased productivity may not lead to increased profits, (2) the difficulty for managers
who desire control to understand the value to the corporation of employee voice and
participation, and (3) the long-term benefits of encouraging employee voice may be
intangible when compared with short-term benefits a corporation believes it receives by
reducing employee voice. See id. at 110 n.25.
260 See Estlund, supra note 9, at 109 (“Employee voice, to be effective in workplace
governance and in monitoring regulatory compliance, must be channeled into workable
and representative structures with power within the workplace.”).
261 See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium:
Redefining a Labor Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1651,
1653-54 n.8 (1999) (discussing team-based workplaces).
262 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 48-50 (1991).
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directors are rare in the United States,263 some large employers
initiate “employee participation programs,” in which employees
are involved in cooperative efforts with corporate management.264
In fact, encouraging whistleblowing regarding financial crime
may find more success than previous attempts to encourage
employee voice regarding other corporate misconduct, because
those previous attempts were adversarial at their core. Employee
voice through unionization traditionally has been met with
hostility by management because of a union’s perceived negative
effect on profitability. Similarly, previous efforts to encourage
whistleblowing regarding the health and safety of the public or its
employees required the corporation to internalize costs it might
rather externalize. For example, dumping toxic waste illegally
might be cheaper for corporations than doing so in compliance
with government regulations.
Having a less safe work
environment or underpaying employees for overtime might seem
less expensive than complying with employee safety and wages
legislation. With these types of activities, there is an inherent
conflict of interest in asking corporations to encourage their
employees to expose misconduct when corporations will lose
money if the misconduct is exposed. Financial crime, however,
less clearly benefits the corporation and its shareholders.
Encouraging whistleblowing regarding financial crime, which by
its nature adheres to the benefit of the shareholders, might be
easier to implement because the corporation’s self-interest is
involved.
V. STRENGTHENING THE STRUCTURAL MODEL
A. Mandating the Model Effectively
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the first attempt to mandate a
whistleblower disclosure channel in the private sector. Yet,
despite its broad application to all publicly-traded corporations,
Sarbanes-Oxley fails to detail any specifics regarding the
disclosure channel. The Act requires only a single channel for
employees of public companies to report questionable accounting

See Gordon, supra note 69, at 1243 (noting that an exception to this rule is
employee-owned United Air Lines).
264 See, e.g., LeRoy, supra note 261, at 1661-66; Robert B. Moberly, The Story of
Electromation, in LABOR LAW STORIES 315, 320-22 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds.
2005).
263
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or auditing matters.265
This mandatory implementation is
important and necessary, but is too limited in scope.
To be sure, government-mandated whistleblower regulation
imposes upon corporate autonomy and an employer’s
relationship with its employees. In fact, this burden traditionally
has been justified only where a public good is being served by
whistleblowers.266 In these cases, government protection is
necessary because corporations likely will not reap the benefit of
reporting conduct that harms the public, such as violations of
environmental laws or improper use of government funds, and
therefore has no incentive to encourage it.267 Consistent with this
rationale, common law courts typically provide greater
protections to whistleblowers who disclose information that
affects a public, rather than a private, interest.268 When only a
private corporate interest is at stake, such as with fraud against
shareholders or internal corporate theft, whistleblowers have not
fared well on claims of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy.269 In these “private interest” cases, it is arguable that a

See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B) (Supp. 2002).
See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 231, at 75; Schwab, supra note 211, at 1945
(discussing protection of whistleblowers who report activities that have “third-party”
effects).
267 See Schwab, supra note 211, at 1970. As put by Dean Schwab in 1996, five years
before Enron declared bankruptcy:
265
266

Certainly, a billion-dollar financial fraud involving elderly pensioners
can have greater harm on third parties than a trivial oil spill. But in
general, companies have great internal incentives to police financial
fraud, either to protect their shareholders or their reputation among
creditors. Companies often cannot capture the gains from an action that
protects public health or safety, and thus that factor often remains
external to their calculus. Allowing a wrongful discharge action to be
asserted by employees fired for blowing the whistle on actions against
public health and safety is one small way to encourage companies to
internalize these costs.
Id.; see also Cynthia Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1655, 1674 (1996) (asserting that actions that are protected from retaliation benefit
third-parties and are “public goods that are likely to be ‘underproduced’ even without
the threat of retaliation”).
268 See Schwab, supra note 211, at 1970.
269 For example, whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing have not been
particularly successful in wrongful discharge suits. See, e.g., Adler v. Am. Standard
Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1305-07 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding discharge of employee for
preparing to disclose commercial bribery and alteration of records); Fox v. MCI
Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 860-61 (Utah 1997) (finding that employee was not
wrongfully discharged because employee’s internal disclosure regarding statutory
violations did not implicate a clear and substantial public policy); Hayes v. Eateries, Inc.,
905 P.2d 778, 788 (Okla. 1995) (refusing to protect employee who internally reported
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corporation is due more deference in its treatment of
whistleblowers because the corporation has the incentive to
determine how much whistleblowing should be permitted and
encouraged.270
This same argument can be expanded to question the need for
the government to mandate structural changes to corporations to
encourage whistleblowing. Thus, the argument goes, if the
Structural Model provides such benefits to the corporation by
encouraging whistleblowers, then perhaps the law should not
require these reforms. The smart, self-interested corporations will
adopt efficient whistleblowing disclosure channels and prosper,
while those entities that do not encourage whistleblowing will
founder.
This argument has some superficial appeal. Indeed, the work
of the market in requiring whistleblower reforms already can be
seen in the aftermath of the corporate scandals. Various investor
and industry groups pressured corporations to utilize their
employees to help detect fraud and other criminal activity. For
example, in 2005 a group of institutional shareholders of WalMart requested that the company review its internal controls, in
part because of concern that the company weakened the resolve of
its employees to report wrongdoing when Wal-Mart fired an
employee who disclosed alleged accounting abuse by the
corporate vice-chairman.271 Similarly, the chairman of Nortel
Networks recently disclosed that no employee at any level of the
company alerted the board to accounting improprieties that were
revealed the previous year.272 In response, the corporation
publicized to its shareholders that it voluntarily instituted a
“whistleblower system” for employees to raise concerns to an
officer that reports directly to the CEO and the chairman of the

embezzlement by a supervisor); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal.
1988) (same).
270 See Schwab, supra note 211, at 1949 (noting that a corporation “is in the best
position to weigh whether the information the employer gains from co-worker tattling is
worth the cost of breakdowns in the corporate chain of command and reduced trust
among coworkers”).
271 See James Covert, Wal-Mart Urged to Review Controls, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2005,
at B7 (quoting a representative of an institutional investor as saying “[i]ndependent
directors need to demonstrate to shareholders that Wal-Mart hasn’t built an ostrich
culture – where employees are better off sticking their heads in the sand than speaking
up”).
272 See David Paddon, Nortel Shareholders Vent Anger Over Fallen Stock Price,
Accounting Scandal, THE CANADIAN PRESS (June 29, 2005), available at
http://news.yahoo.com/s/cpress/20050630/ca_pr-on-bu/Nortel_6&printer=1;_ylt+
ArhFOh.
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board.273 Other market forces may encourage whistleblowers to
report matters externally if internal whistleblowers are not
supported. A non-profit group called Wal-Mart Watch recently
placed thousands of phone calls to Bentonville, Arkansas, where
Wal-Mart is headquartered, attempting to encourage employees
“who know of wrongdoing” inside the company to come forward
with information.274 In short, from the “free market” perspective,
the market and other non-governmental forces can and do
provide incentives to corporations to encourage the disclosure of
internal fraud by their employees.
However, these market forces often do not work effectively.275
Although the market has begun pressuring large corporations to
encourage whistleblowers, several barriers exist that may prevent
corporations from voluntarily implementing a sufficient system.
For example, it may be efficient for corporations not to monitor
effectively, because the law may under-enforce certain regulations
(either because there is imperfect monitoring so detection of
misconduct is limited, or because penalties are set too low, or
both), thus encouraging certain wrongdoing that is profitable.276
Further, it is unlikely that the majority of public companies will
draw the type of media and investor scrutiny that Wal-Mart has
encountered. Additionally, managers may implement less-thaneffective monitoring systems because they personally benefit from
certain undetected misconduct but do not incur costs from
violations by subordinates.277 Moreover, even if directors and
officers of a corporation believe that it would benefit from
increased monitoring by its employees, it may face costs in that a
corporation’s supervisors may resent increased monitoring and
supervision. By mandating a structural whistleblowing approach,
the law can relieve pressure on a corporation and lessen the extent

273 Id. In addition, Volkswagen AG recently responded to disclosures of alleged
bribery and other wrongdoing by corporate executives by announcing that it would hire
two ombudsmen to receive anonymous employee complaints. See Stephen Power,
Volkswagen Strengthens Controls In Wake of Internal Bribery Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12-13,
2005, at A4.
274 See John Harwood, Washington Wire: Help Wanted, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2005, at
A4.
275 Securities regulation is justified, in part, because a collective action problem
often prevents dispersed shareholders from implementing reforms that could better
protect their interests. See McDonnell, supra note 178, at 535.
276 See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 80.
277 See id.
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to which supervisors may feel that their employer is imposing a
whistleblowing system because it does not trust them.278
Furthermore, despite the private-public line that some courts
attempt to draw,279 reducing illegal corporate fraud actually
affects the larger public interest as well as the corporate private
interest.280 Corporate fraud undermines the public’s confidence in
the financial market and reduces the market’s transparency and
security.281 Moreover, today’s modern corporations are the
centers of economic universes and corporate fraud can harm
entire communities – not only corporate shareholders.282 Given
their large effect on the public interest, it may be that
whistleblowers are actually more necessary in the private sector
than in the public sphere. As Phillip Blumberg noted over three
decades ago, in the public sphere, an opposition party usually will
be able to provide oversight regarding the administration of the

278 See Cunningham, supra note 142, at 293 (“Mandatory controls serve a sanitizing
function for modulating the trust-suspicion trade-off. Controls mandated by law may
be imposed by the corporation on employees without expressing a particularized
mistrust of them.”); Sturm, supra note 130, at 520-21 (noting that the law can help
“justify the implementation of initiatives lacking short-term economic pay-off, and
legitim[ize] the pursuit of ethical values of fairness and respectful treatment in the
workplace”).
279 See Schwab, supra note 211, at 1949 (explaining that the private/public
distinction is often more conclusory than helpful).
280 See id. at 1970 (noting that “legislature presumably declared the act illegal in
order to protect the public from wrongdoing”).
281 See 148 CONG. REC. S7352, S7360 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 – Conference Report). As noted by the SEC when it issued rules requiring that
audit committees set up a system to receive employee complaints, “[v]igilant and
informed oversight by a strong, effective and independent audit committee could help
to counterbalance pressures to misreport results and impose increased discipline on the
process of preparing financial information. Improved oversight may help detect
fraudulent financial reporting earlier and perhaps thus deter it or minimize its effects.
All of these benefits imply increased market efficiency due to improved information and
investor confidence in the reliability of a company’s financial disclosure and system of
internal controls.” See SEC Release, supra note 147, at 18,813.
282 Thousands of Enron employees lost their jobs and, as a group, Enron
employees lost over $1 billion in retirement accounts containing a high proportion of
Enron stock. See Kroger, supra note 26, at 58. Local businesses that relied on Enron and
its employees were negatively affected. See Kate Murphy, Corporate Lepers, Local Heroes?,
BUS. WK. ONLINE, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
jun2005/nf20050630_0279_db017.htm (June 30, 2005) (“Enron employees who lost their
jobs and retirement savings weren’t the only people hurt. From local Porsche dealers to
caterers, graphic designers, and travel agents, many folks either went out of business or
took a tremendous hit because of what happened at Enron.”); cf. Blumberg, supra note
239, at 299 (noting that large corporations can have characteristics of a private
government because of their large revenues and substantial number of employees and
shareholders).
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government.283 In a corporation, however, a whistleblower may
be more necessary because management may not be controllable
by shareholders or a board of directors.284 If effect on the public
interest is the sine qua non of government intervention, then
reducing corporate fraud should satisfy this standard, particularly
in light of the significant public impact of the recent corporate
scandals.
Thus, the government can address weaknesses of the “free
market” approach by imposing some structural reform.285
Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandatory approach to whistleblower
disclosure channels improves upon previous versions of the
Structural Model, which provided only weak incentives for
corporations to implement structural change.
But, how much regulation should there be? Section 301 of
Sarbanes-Oxley imposes a minimalist version of the Structural
Model: it requires only that a public company’s audit committee
establish procedures for receiving complaints, including
confidential, anonymous concerns from employees, regarding
accounting issues.286 In many ways, not requiring any specific
procedures makes sense. Small corporations may prefer to
outsource the complaint procedure to a third-party to handle
“hotline” calls. Others may determine that they want a more
investigative function, and appoint ombudsmen or ethics officers
with broad responsibilities and reporting obligations. In fact,
behavioral research suggests that an organization’s structure
greatly impacts the type of encouragement necessary to effectively
encourage whistleblowing, such that a range of approaches may
be successful.287 This diversity of options works well in an
economy with a wide variety of workplaces.
Flexibility
encourages experimentation with a range of processes, and

See Blumberg, supra note 239, at 306.
See id.
285 To the extent a mandatory system remains unappealing, certain required
disclosures could still encourage the development of whistleblower systems. For
example, rather than mandate certain disclosure systems, regulators could develop a list
of “best practices” for such compliance systems. Corporations could comply with these
practices or disclose why they do not. Cf. Paredes, supra note 18, at 526 (suggesting such
a system for corporate governance more broadly). Although this is a second-best
option, it may prove more viable in a regime where mandatory regulation is disfavored.
286 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(4) (Supp. 2002).
287 See Granville King, The Implications of an Organization’s Structure on
Whistleblowing, 20 J. BUS. ETHICS 315, 324 (1999).
283
284
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ultimately will help develop various best practices for industries
and companies.288
However, in order to realize the full potential of the Structural
Model as a means of improving corporate governance, certain
specifics could be fleshed out and expanded upon through
legislation or regulation.
In particular, Sarbanes-Oxley’s
vagueness contributes to two significant problems with its
Structural Model.
The first problem is that the Model may not work well enough.
Specifically, without supplemental requirements, it may be too
easy for corporations to implement a system that looks acceptable
on paper, but that is not functional or effective in reality. As
demonstrated above, this problem contributed to the failure of the
Model prior to the corporate scandals, and Sarbanes-Oxley does
not fix the problem sufficiently.289
Conversely, the second problem is that the Model may work
too well. Employees may make too many complaints about
matters that do not merit director investigation. In other words, a
powerful Structural Model may provide too much information,
often called “noise,” with only a fraction of the information
actually proving useful. Busy corporate directors and officers
may spend an inefficient amount of time responding to
insubstantial employee complaints.
The future success of Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model
depends upon addressing both of these concerns. Below, I
suggest solutions that involve mandating slightly more structure
than is currently imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. These suggestions
are aimed at achieving an efficient level of information flow to
directors, while still permitting corporations flexibility in
constructing whistleblower disclosure systems that work best for
their organizational configuration.
B. Addressing the Cheating Problem
Perhaps the most widely cited problem with internal
compliance systems is that it can be easy for a corporation to
“cheat” by implementing a superficial and ineffective system.290

288 See Sturm, supra note 130, at 492 (discussing structural systems to address
employment discrimination issues and criticizing a “one-size-fits-all model or a
predetermined set of criteria,” because it would “cut off the process of organizational
development and experimentation that is so crucial to an effective regulatory system”).
289 See discussion supra Part III.B.
290 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 144, at 675; Krawiec, supra note 142, at 491;
Langevoort, supra note 181, at 107.
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The effectiveness of a system is difficult for outsiders to judge,
specifically courts, prosecutors, or other administrative agencies,
because “the indicia of an effective compliance system are easily
mimicked.”291 Given the difficulty of accurate and thorough
outside evaluation, corporations may install programs that look
good on paper and permit them to check the necessary
compliance boxes, but have little or no effect on whether
individuals in an organization commit less crime.292
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model suffers from this same
criticism in that it would be relatively easy for a corporation to
implement a “disclosure channel” for whistleblower reporting,
yet implicitly discourage the use of the channel by director
inattentiveness to complaints, lack of publicity of the procedures
necessary to utilize the program, or subtle retaliation against
employees who report misconduct. Given the relative weakness
of anti-retaliation laws to protect the more subtle forms of
discouragement, this cheating problem may undermine the
effectiveness of the Structural Model if it is not addressed.
Tools typically found in the corporate regulatory regime can
be utilized to improve Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model, reduce
the ability of corporations to cheat, and thus remedy this defect.
As discussed in detail below, two such tools – disclosure and
incentives - may significantly mitigate the cheating problem.
First, corporations could be required to disclose information
regarding their whistleblowing channels. This disclosure could
include both a description of the structure of the channel as well
as a summary of evaluative metrics about the performance of the
structure. Second, corporations could be given more incentive to
implement a fully developed and effective disclosure channel.
One suggestion is that a corporation could be provided a safe
harbor from certain claims if it satisfies certain whistleblower
disclosure channel standards through a pre-approval process.
Surprisingly, although these tools were used in other parts of
Sarbanes-Oxley to bolster the Act’s reform efforts, they were not
applied to support further encouragement of whistleblowers.293

Krawiec, supra note 142, at 491-92; see also Langevoort, supra note 181, at 117-18.
Cf. Langevoort, supra note 181, at 107 (criticizing “values-based” programs as
being “easy to mimic, making it difficult to separate out the sincere programs from the
fakes”), 113-14; Krawiec, supra note 142, at 487, 491 (noting that such programs may be
mere “window-dressing,” and can have several negative effects, including an “underdeterrence of corporate misconduct,” and “a proliferation of costly – but arguably
ineffective – internal compliance structures”).
293 See infra text accompanying notes 297-301.
291
292
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1. Disclosure of Structure and Results
Cheating can be discouraged by requiring companies to
disclose information regarding both the structure of their
whistleblowing disclosure channel as well as the results arising
from disclosures made through the channel. As a further
incentive to provide accurate information, these disclosures could
be certified by the head of the audit committee, in the same
manner that other important corporate information requires
executive level certification when it is disclosed to the public.294
These disclosures also could be posted internally, similarly to
other federal employment law posting requirements,295 so that
employees have direct knowledge of the procedures and results of
employee whistleblowing.
Disclosure and transparency are important principles of
limited government regulation of markets.296
Accordingly,
Sarbanes-Oxley recognizes that other areas related to internal
enforcement should be disclosed.297 Under Title IV of SarbanesOxley, disclosures related to various financial and ethical
obligations are required.298 For example, a corporation must
disclose whether or not it has adopted a code of ethics for senior
financial officers,299 as well as any change in or waiver of the code
for these officers.300
Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that a
corporation’s annual report must contain an “internal control
report” that contains an assessment of the effectiveness of its
internal control structure.301 As they relate to whistleblowers,
however, these provisions are narrowly drawn. A code of ethics
would not necessarily involve whistleblowers and the disclosures
for internal controls relate only to financial reporting, which likely

294 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 302 & 906, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 & 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (Supp. 2002) (requiring personal certification by officers of various publicly
disclosed reports).
295 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (requiring the posting of notice to employees
regarding legal protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
296 Backer, supra note 228, at 331 n.8; Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale,
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859,
861 (2003).
297 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (stating that
purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to “protect investors by improving the accuracy and
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws”).
298 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§401-409, (codified in scattered section of 15
U.S.C.) (Supp. 2002).
299 See id., § 406(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a).
300 See id., § 406(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7264(b).
301 See id., § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262.
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would not detail the structure of a whistleblower disclosure
channel.
Furthermore, in practice these disclosures from
management are little more than boilerplate attestations from
executives.302
More could be required regarding the disclosure of
whistleblower channels.
SEC regulations could require
publication of a description of the individuals responsible for toplevel review of complaints from employee whistleblowers, and
how that review is accomplished, such as whether entire files are
reviewed at that level or whether and how files are screened.
Further, corporations could reveal whether the disclosure system
is provided internally or is outsourced (and to whom), the method
by which employees are encouraged to report misconduct, and
the means by which employee concerns are evaluated and
investigated.303 In other words, relatively specific information
about the system could be disclosed. As with other regular
corporate disclosures, disclosures relating to the whistleblower
system could be required in a corporation’s periodic or annual
reports, as well as on corporate websites.304
Of course, disclosure is not the answer to every problem.
Disclosure may be costly for corporations because compiling and
presenting the required information accurately can be an
enormous undertaking. Currently, corporations are revolting
against Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement that they disclose their
internal financial controls because they claim the costs are

302 See, e.g., THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 115 (2005), available at
http://ir.thecoca-colacompany.com (noting that “management believes that the
Company maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as of
December 31, 2004”).
303 See Comments of William F. Ezzell, CPA, Chairman, Board of Directors &
Barry C. Melancon, CPA President and CEO, American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, February 18, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s70203/wfezzell1.htm (providing comments to SEC regarding its implementation of
Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (“The company should annually disclose
whether or not they have a system in place, and whether that system relies on internal
resources, or they have engaged an external service provider. If substantive changes are
made to the procedures during the year, that fact should be reported via Form 8-k and
the next annual disclosure should provide similar detail.”).
304 Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC regulations currently require other information about
a corporation to be posted on corporate websites, such as statements related to the
beneficial ownership of securities of a corporation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(16) (Supp. 2002);
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (permitting posting of required
corporate code of ethics to corporate website). Similarly, the New York Stock Exchange
requires each of its listed companies to post its code of business conduct and ethics on
their corporate website. See New York Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Rules,
Section 303A, NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 10.
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staggering.305 Moreover, too much disclosure to the market may
produce too much information for investors, such that the
marginal benefit of the disclosed information to investors does not
justify the increased cost to the corporation of making the
disclosure.306
However, disclosure of the systems, and the subsequent
certification of such disclosures by the audit committee, has many
benefits. Such disclosure will reduce the temptation to implement
systems that can function as mere window-dressing, an easy way
to avoid truly encouraging whistleblowers. With more public
disclosure, corporations (and signatory directors) will face
financial and possible criminal exposure if the whistleblower
system does not mirror its public description.
Certified public disclosures also would provide shareholders
the opportunity to assess the effort corporations undertake to
prevent fraud.307 Shareholders may prefer companies in which
whistleblowing is encouraged through extensive whistleblower
systems, because strong internal control systems may lead to less
regulatory oversight308 as well as easier access to capital through
more positive assessments from credit-rating agencies.309 In this
way, disclosure can provide signaling benefits because it sends “a

See Deborah Solomon, At What Price?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R3.
See Comments of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, February 18, 2003, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/pricewater1.htm (providing comments
to SEC regarding its implementation of Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley) (“While we
acknowledge the fact that these disclosures may be meaningful to investors, we believe
that there needs to be a balance between relevant information and information
overload.”).
307 See Schmidt, supra note 222, at 26-29 (arguing that disclosure of compliance
policies will put market pressure on corporations to institute whistleblower protections);
cf. Ribstein, supra note 17, at 291 (“A fully informed market arguably ought to be able to
evaluate the adequacy of firms’ monitoring and control mechanisms and to encourage
firms to efficiently balance the costs and benefits of adopting additional controls.”).
308 See Painter, supra note 230, at 268 (noting that regulators have limited
enforcement budgets and might direct enforcement activity towards actors it believes
have not given proper incentives to encourage internal reporting, thus reducing costs
because a regulator might “require less frequent and less burdensome reporting, request
fewer documents, and conduct less extensive investigations”); Diya Gullapalli, Living
With Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R1, R3 (noting that Dow Chemical
strengthened its relationship with “key regulators at the SEC and the accountingoversight board” by developing a “reputation for transparency and activism in
compliance”).
309 Cf. Painter, supra note 230, at 272 (“Most investors cannot themselves acquire,
process, and verify all relevant information about issuers whose securities they
purchase. The amount they would spend doing so would not be justified by the return.
Investors thus rely, to a great extent, on ‘reputational intermediaries,” such as bond
rating agencies, investment advisors, and investment banks to cost-effectively tap into
the information market on their behalf.”).
305
306
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positive message to shareholders and regulators about checks on
management’s conduct.”310 To the extent shareholders value
strong internal control systems, the required disclosure of
whistleblower polices could encourage managers to implement
enhanced internal controls to increase the company’s
attractiveness to shareholders.311 Public information about weak
internal controls, on the other hand, will inform shareholders
about riskier investments with the greater potential for fraud.312
Moreover, disclosure of whistleblower procedures will
encourage employees to report misconduct by giving them
explicit instruction on the best means of making whistleblower
complaints.313 Under the current Sarbanes-Oxley version of the
Structural Model, there is no obligation to publicize the existence
of the disclosure procedures, which may cause employees to
underutilize the whistleblower channel. This omission is odd
given the utilization of such required disclosures to employees in
other federal employment statutes, such as Title VII.314
In addition to disclosing information regarding the structure
of the system, corporations could be required to disclose the
results of their whistleblower disclosure system. Specifically,
corporations could disclose information such as the number of
complaints received by the system, the types of complaints
(accounting, theft, discrimination, work conditions, etc.), and the
resolution or procedural posture of the complaints (found to be
without merit, substantiated, etc.).315 Corporations could be
further required to disclose the current employment status of
employees who submitted complaints to clarify whether
whistleblowers suffer any tangible employment action during a

310 Id. at 256. But see Comments of Charles M. Nathan, Committee on Securities
Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, February 18, 2003,
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/cmnathan1.htm (providing
comments to SEC regarding its implementation of Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley) (“The
Committee also recommends that listed companies be allowed to choose whether or not
they disclose their procedures for handling complaints as such procedures are not in the
ordinary course of interest to investors or shareholders.”).
311 See Coffee, supra note 25, at 1277-78.
312 Cf. MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 14 (“[I]nvestors and potential investors who
are warned of financial wrongdoing may avoid the loss of substantial resources by
investing in more ethical or better managed organizations.”).
313 See Near & Dworkin, supra note 113, at 1557; Memo. from Larry D. Thompson,
Deputy Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep’t Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attys.,
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), at 10, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_organizations.pdf.
314 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10.
315 Cf. Callahan, et al., supra note 125, at 210 (proposing that ombudsmen prepare
summaries of complaints received, the investigation, and any actions taken).
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restricted period after they disclose information.316
Some
organizations already use these types of metrics to evaluate their
internal compliance systems.317 For example, Intel measures the
utilization rate of their internal dispute resolution system, the
number of internal versus external complaints, the type of
complaints and their resolutions, and the perceived effectiveness
of the system as measured by employee and manager feedback.318
Analogously, under the NO FEAR Act, federal agencies disclose
statistics regarding the number and type of discrimination
complaints each agency received from its employees, including
the results of those complaints.319
Publication of specific results from a whistleblower disclosure
system is important for several reasons. First, disclosing specific
results will avoid a “lemons” problem that might develop,
whereby companies may be unable to signal that they have
superior whistleblowing procedures if companies with inferior
procedures can send similar signals.320 Companies, in other
words, will be put to their proof regarding the results from their
system, and not merely be able to rely on impressive looking
window-dressing. Corporations will be forced to explain and to
justify their disclosure channel structure, as well as their own
evaluation of the structure’s effectiveness.321
Second, these public explanations from corporations will
assist
in developing
“best
practices”
and promote
experimentation, while also providing courts and regulators a

Auditors already are protected through a similar mechanism in which
corporations must report the discharge of an outside accountant. See Schedule 8-K.
317 One recent survey found that 75% of U.S. public companies tracked whether
their ethical codes were followed. See Neil Baker, All Done With Mirrors? Transparency
and Business Ethics, INTERN’L BAR NEWS, at 5 (Aug. 2005).
318 See Sturm, supra note 130, at 559 (describing Intel’s assessment techniques).
Intel is certainly not alone in its attempt to evaluate the success of its own disclosure
program. See Kenneth D. Martin, Where Theory and Reality Converge: Three Corporate
Experiences in Developing “Effective” Compliance Programs, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3,
at 39-40 (describing metrics kept by Sundstrand Corp. regarding its compliance
program).
319 See Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act
of 2002, Pub. L. 107-174, 116 Stat. 566, §§ 203; 301 (2002).
320 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); see also Painter, supra note 230, at 275-76
(describing this problem in a market for attorneys who must report wrongdoing).
321 Cf. Sturm, supra note 130, at 559 (describing a system whereby courts examine
the effectiveness of an internal grievance system by requiring employers “to develop
and justify criteria of effectiveness in problem solving for their own internal systems,”
thereby encouraging “employers to evaluate their own systems, rewarding employers
who do so”).
316
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viable means of judging the effectiveness of a corporation’s own
system.322
Third, publishing results from whistleblowing systems will
provide employees with information regarding the effectiveness
of their own monitoring efforts. As discussed above, a significant
disincentive for employees to report misconduct is their concern
that nothing will be done about their report.323 Requiring
companies to disclose the results of whistleblower disclosures will
address this concern, because it will demonstrate that violators of
ethical and legal norms will be held accountable.324 Moreover, in
his work on “self-regulatory” approaches to promoting employee
policy compliance, Tom Tyler has argued that employees are
more willing to follow workplace rules and think positively about
their employer when the organization demonstrates that it treats
employees with procedural fairness.325 Thus, publicizing that the
system “works” and that procedures are fairly administered not
only can encourage employees to report misconduct, but also can
persuade employees to behave more appropriately themselves.
Fourth, publishing results can serve as an important impetus
for reform. For example, published results of whistleblower
disclosures under the Civil Service Reform Act revealed that the
Office of Special Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board
failed to protect and encourage whistleblowers. In the eleven
years after passage of the CSRA, only one whistleblower received
a hearing by the OSC to protect the whistleblower’s job.326 Only
four whistleblowers (out of more than two thousand appeals)
won on the merits after they appealed to the Merit Systems
Protection Board.327 These statistics served as partial impetus for
the passage of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, which

322 See id.; cf. Langevoort, supra note 181, at 114-15 (noting that the “legal standard
underlying an affirmative monitoring requirement should be set at a moderate height,”
such as industry best practices); but see Comments of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton,
February
18,
2003,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/clearygot1.htm (providing comments to
SEC regarding its implementation of Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley) (“Disclosure about
procedures and changes to those procedures may have an unintended chilling effect. If
an issuer is forced to disclose its procedures, the audit committee may be less innovative
and less willing to try different approaches.”).
323 See supra text accompanying notes 170-72.
324 See Trevino, supra note 25, at 1200.
325 See Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in
Work Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1303-05
(2005).
326 See Devine, supra note 140, at 534.
327 See id. at 534.
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addressed some of the perceived problems with the CSRA’s
whistleblower system.328
Perhaps understandably, corporations may resist disclosing
these results. Mandatory disclosure requires the corporation to
reveal potentially embarrassing information publicly and may
place employers at the mercy of disgruntled employees. Further,
disclosing results may have the opposite of the desired effect.
Rather than increase whistleblower disclosures, it may pressure
managers to suppress complaints in order to make a company’s
numbers look better.329 Yet, such disclosure is not markedly
different than requiring disclosure of earnings and revenue
numbers that embarrass the corporation.
Both types of
disclosures aim to present a clearer picture of the corporation to
the investing public. Moreover, as with financial numbers, there
will be no restriction on a corporation’s truthful efforts to explain
and to justify poor results.
2. Providing Incentive
Corporations already receive limited incentives from the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and various court decisions
to implement internal compliance systems.
However, as
discussed above, the usefulness of these incentives to create
effective systems is questionable because the incentives do not
necessarily prevent cheating.330 Another form of incentive may
better encourage corporations to install and to enforce effective
systems that encourage employee whistleblowers to come
forward.
Corporations could be provided a safe harbor for installing
systems that met standards for effectiveness promulgated by the
SEC or another administrative agency. Such standards could
include specific requirements, such as providing for an
independent review of whistleblower claims and intensive
training of managers. This safe harbor could be granted through
a pre-approval process in which an administrative agency, such as
the SEC, or a certified third-party, such as a truly independent
auditor, could rigorously investigate and evaluate systems for
effectiveness.
This pre-approval process avoids the tricky

See id. at 536 & 536 n.22; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 282-83.
Cf. Coffee, supra note 25, at 1251-65 (noting that disclosure can raise a
corporation’s “embarrassment cost” to a “prohibitively high level” that may actually
restrict information flow).
330 See discussion supra Part III.B.
328
329
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proposition of courts and prosecutors evaluating a program
externally after wrongdoing has occurred.
The benefit for the corporation would be that, in criminal and
civil litigation where proof of an effective whistleblower system is
meaningful,331 the safe harbor could provide a rebuttable
presumption that the system was effective. The mechanism to
implement this safe harbor would vary depending on the context.
To apply to criminal sentencing, the OSG would need to be
amended.332 To apply to discrimination cases or with regard to
punitive damages, specific legislation may need to be passed to
recognize such a safe harbor. Yet, even without such legislation,
courts may accept such certification as the industry standard
when evaluating internal control systems, thereby serving the
same function as a mandatory safe harbor provision.
Corporations would still be encouraged to prevent
wrongdoing through other means, because the presumption
would not reduce a company’s vicarious liability for the acts of its
employees.333 However, my proposal would provide incentive to
implement a true whistleblower disclosure system by reducing a
corporation’s exposure to the extreme punishments imposed
upon corporations, such as criminal fines and punitive damages.
This system would take the guess work out of complying with
incentives-based programs, such as the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, and also ensure that corporations spent an
appropriate amount of resources on the system.334

331 See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (providing affirmative
defense in sexual harassment cases); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807
(1998) (same); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1999) (protecting
corporations with internal compliance systems from punitive damages); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8B2.1, 8C2.5 (2004) (providing substantial reduction
in penalties for corporation with effective compliance and ethics program).
332 Admittedly, given that the Guidelines recently were amended in 2004 and the
current uncertainty about their application, see U.S. v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 751 (2005)
(finding that the Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment), any proposal to amend the
Guidelines along these lines may have difficulty gaining sufficient support.
333 See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 114-15 (noting that firms should not be
absolved of vicarious liability simply for installing monitoring systems because firms
need to internalize sanctions for wrongdoing in order to have incentive to develop
sound compliance program).
334 Cf. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 843 (1994) (noting that corporations will spend less on detection of
criminal acts if there is not sufficient reduction in fines and penalties for these selfenforcement efforts, because additional enforcement expenditures would increase
expected criminal liability by detecting more crime).
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C. Addressing the Noise Problem
A second problem with the Structural Model is that
whistleblower disclosure channels may be too successful. They
may open the floodgates for employee dissatisfactions related to a
wide-range of injustices, real and perceived.335 Indeed, a common
occurrence after the introduction of a hotline or other disclosure
channel is for employee complaints to increase.336 This “noise”
problem could be a significant concern for any system that
requires reporting to be channeled to directors, such as the system
mandated by Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Evidence is
mounting that directors are becoming overly burdened by the
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley in general, and thus corporations
may need to compensate directors more generously in order to
find qualified and independent individuals to serve.337 A
particularly active whistleblower disclosure channel may only
amplify these concerns.
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model can be improved to
address this issue. Specifically, the SEC could promulgate rules
permitting (but not requiring) certain restrictions on the systems
to reduce the burden on directors. For example, the SEC could
specify that directors may outsource the reporting requirement to
a third-party or permit the corporation to install an ombudsman
to supervise the system. In either case, it would be important that
the recipient of the whistleblower disclosures provide regular
reports to the audit committee regarding the number and types of
complaints made through the system. Furthermore, the recipient
should be responsible solely to the audit committee, not to a
corporate executive. This recipient, whether a third-party or an
internal ombudsmen, would provide the audit committee with a
valuable service. At the same time, however, the audit committee
would retain the independent control and review that is crucial to
avoid managerial blocking and filtering of disclosures.
Finally, the SEC could permit the audit committee to be
shielded from disclosures regarding de minimis, or nonmaterial,
offenses. This limitation ensures that directors preserve oversight
over the most important information, but are not overly burdened

335 Cf. Sturm, supra note 130, at 502 (describing internal grievance system at Intel,
which includes an employee call center that fields hundreds of thousands of calls).
336 See, e.g., id. at 508 (noting that after the adoption of an internal grievance
system at Intel, “the number of employee complaints increased substantially”).
337 See James S. Linck, et al., Effects and Unintended Consequences of the SarbanesOxley Act on Corporate Boards (August 31, 2005), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687496, at 4
(noting that small public firms are disproportionally impacted by these higher costs).
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with insignificant complaints.
The limits placed on such
disclosures could include only providing information to the audit
committee that, if true, would necessitate public disclosure in
order to comply with previous public filings. Such a limit would
essentially incorporate the definition of “materiality” from federal
securities laws regulating public disclosure in other contexts.
While these suggestions may, yet again, give discretion to a
non-director to screen and filter whistleblower disclosures, the
danger is minimized because independent directors ultimately
would still be responsible for the system. Directors, rather than
corporate executives, would be responsible for determining what
is “material” and what should be disclosed publicly. Moreover,
such limitations may simply be a practical necessity for large
corporations with tens of thousands of employees.
Approving certain restrictions to the disclosure system could
save corporations from implementing overly rigorous and
inefficient structures in an attempt to satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley’s
ambiguous mandate. For example, some corporations may not
need all of the bells and whistles of a full ombudsman program
and would benefit from the set cost of a third-party system. Yet,
given the vague mandate from Sarbanes-Oxley, these
corporations may install a more expensive system in order to
comply with the statute’s requirement. Such a system may be
more comprehensive, but may not provide any marginal benefit
to either the corporation or its employees. Providing absolute
minimums for the disclosure channel permits a corporation to
balance its need for directors to have time and energy to oversee
the actual business activities of the corporation with SarbanesOxley’s requirement that these same directors have oversight of
and responsibility for a whistleblower disclosure system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The corporate scandals demonstrated that, despite the efforts
of a few employee whistleblowers, many corporate employees
failed to monitor their corporation’s behavior sufficiently and to
report the misconduct they observed. Problems with information
flow from employees to traditional corporate monitors
undermined the ability of employees to perform any monitoring
role effectively.
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model presents an improved
attempt to encourage corporate employees to become corporate
monitors and to overcome these flow-of-information problems.
The model should lead to more employee whistleblowing,
because it better corresponds with employee motivations and
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reduces the most prominent disincentives to whistleblowing. As
important, the model should improve the effectiveness of
whistleblower disclosures because it encourages reporting
directly to independent corporate directors, who have the
authority and responsibility to respond to information about
wrongdoing.
Yet, this better model has limitations that can be ameliorated.
The vagueness of Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements has the potential
to both under- and over-produce whistleblower complaints. As
with other attempts to implement effective compliance systems, it
will be possible for corporations to utilize disclosure systems that
are mere “window-dressing,” thus resulting in too few
disclosures.
Requiring corporations to publicly disclose
information about their systems, and the results achieved through
those systems, may reduce this cheating problem. Additionally,
permitting some safe harbor for corporations that satisfy a preapproval process may permit more external oversight of the
effectiveness of whistleblower disclosure systems.
Conversely, a direct channel to the board of directors may
result in too many disclosures, which will overwhelm directors
who already are under increasing pressure from Sarbanes-Oxley’s
other regulatory requirements. The SEC could explicitly permit
directors to outsource their oversight of the whistleblower
disclosure channel, as long as the responsibility for the channel
remains with the directors. Promulgating specific, approved
restrictions and options may reduce the burden on directors,
while still facilitating the transfer of information about corporate
misconduct from front-line employees to the corporate monitors
with the authority and responsibility to address the wrongdoing.
These reforms will help Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model
encourage employees to play an active role in monitoring
corporate behavior – a role that not only will benefit society by
reducing corporate misconduct, but also will improve corporate
decision-making by increasing employee voice within the
corporation.

